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ABSTRACT 
Hedge funds are investment vehicles that provide solid risk-adjusted 
performance in various stages of market cycle and that are not strongly correlated to the 
markets they transact in. The profits from hedge funds were for a long time available 
only to high net-worth individuals or institutional investors, who could bear the possible 
negative effects of a serious downturn of the fund. The recent development in the hedge 
fund industry however leans toward the exploitation of hedge fund returns by a wider 
range of investors. Many hedge fund databases and investment banks have thus 
created different hedge fund indices and hedge fund clones that would replicate the 
exposures of hedge funds with smaller fees and smaller investment requirements. Our 
analysis showed that the development of such products has advanced into more 
promising stages, when new approaches are used to better replicate the hedge fund 
returns.  
 
ABSTRAKT 
Hedžové fondy sú investičné nástroje, ktoré poskytujú spoľahlivú rizikovo 
upravenú výkonnosť v rozličných obdobiach trhového cyklu, a ktoré nie sú príliš 
korelované s trhmi na ktorých obchodujú. Výnosy hedžových fondov boli po dlhé 
obdobie prístupné len bohatým jednotlivcom alebo inštitucionálnym investorom, ktorý by 
mohli odolať možným negatívnym efektom z poklesu hodnoty fondu. Nedávny vývoj 
tohto priemyslu však smeruje k využívaniu výnosov hedžových fondov širším okruhom 
investorov. Preto sa množstvo databáz hedžových fondov a investičných bánk rozhodlo 
vytvoriť rozličné indexy a klony hedžových fondov, ktoré budú replikovať ich investície 
s menšími poplatkami a menšími potrebnými vkladmi. Naša analýza ukázala, že vývoj 
takýchto produktov sa posunul do sľubnejších stupňov, keď sa začínajú využívať nové 
prístupy replikácie výnosov hedžových fondov.   
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1. Introduction 
Hedge funds are private investment vehicles that provide their investors with 
extraordinary risk-adjusted returns during all stages of market cycle. The hedge fund 
industry has undergone a rapid development in the previous two decades and has 
gained on importance in the financial markets. Consequently, the interest of wider base 
of investors and regulators has emerged. The investors want to gain access to the 
returns of this special asset class and the regulators are trying to assess the impact of 
the industry on the whole market and the global economy by knowing the true 
exposures of their investment. Thus, new products as hedge fund indices and clones 
have emerged that provide access to the returns of hedge funds without the 
requirements to directly invest into them. Such products are moreover beginning to use 
as a benchmarks for the hedge fund managers, who would only be able to charge the 
high performance fees after they have outperformed such benchmarks. 
The article has the following structure. In chapters 2 and 3, we would introduce 
the reader with the historical development and the definition of hedge funds. Then, in 
chapter 4 and 5, we would describe the strategies that individual hedge funds apply and 
analyze the return characteristics of hedge funds. In chapter 6, we would discuss the 
hedge fund indices and their issues. Finally in chapters 7 and 8, we would focus on 
hedge fund replication strategies, first in a theoretical perspective and than in an 
empirical exercise. The section 9 concludes. 
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2. Historical and contemporary development 
The history of hedge funds dates back as far as 1949, when Alfred Winslow 
Jones started his first private equity fund. As a journalist working for the Fortune 
magazine, he realized that a higher return could be achieved, when hedging is 
employed in the investment strategy. Even though hedging unfavorable price movement 
risk had been in practice since the 18th century, when the commodity traders used 
forward pricing, Jones added two important ingredients to the investment strategy. First, 
he used short positions to eliminate the market risk exposure of long-only trading. The 
strategy was basically a long/short stock picking, where the returns of such strategy 
depended on the skills of the manager to produce positive returns. Second, to further 
enhance the returns of his strategy, Jones employed leverage to his investment 
strategy, which would allow him to take on large bets with smaller own capital 
requirements. He started his fund by raising $ 100 000 of which $ 40 000 was his own 
money. In its beginnings the fund was a general partnership fund, which he altered after 
three years into limited partnership fund with an incentive fee of 20 % as compensation 
to the manager. This final fund setup represented the first hedge fund as we know them 
now. Even after 60 years, the contemporary hedge funds are based more or less on the 
four characteristics of Jones’s fund – hedging (short selling), leverage, limited 
partnership with a significant proportion of the capital brought in by the manager and a 
large incentive fee as a compensation for the skills of the manager. The last two 
characteristics are meant to bring about the alignment of the managers and investors 
incentives. The success of Jones’s fund came into the light in 1966, when an article in 
the Fortune magazine highlighted his investment strategy that outperformed every 
mutual fund by 85 % in last five years net off fees. By 1968, there were some 140 
hedge funds. The bloom of the industry had short living since most of the new funds 
didn’t follow Jones’s strategy, but rather employed only the leverage combined with 
long-only investment. After a bearish stock market in the early 1970’s, the number of 
funds dropped to the half. However, the rebirth of the industry started in the 1980’s, 
when managers such as George Soros, Michael Steinhart, and Julian Robertson 
regained the confidence in hedge funds by making large returns in unfavorable 
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conditions. Moreover, new investment tools such as currency trading, derivatives 
(options, futures) were established and the hedge fund industry begun to be more 
heterogeneous. By 1990’s there were more than 500 funds with assets under 
management of about $ 38 billion. The heydays of the hedge fund industry, which could 
provide high returns during the tech bubble in the 1990’s and when the number of 
hedge funds increased to 4 000 with almost $ 500 billion of assets under management, 
had a short setback in the early 2000’s after the collapse of LTCM and an equity bubble, 
which led to problems and even collapse of some hedge funds. After this minor setback, 
the industry took deep breadth and started to flourish even more and by even larger 
pace. According to HedgeFund.net and Institutional Investor News the assets under 
management at the end of third quarter 2007 reached nearly $ 2,7 trillion.   
The contemporary development of the industry, as depicted in Figure 1, is a sign 
of maturing of the industry and the rising role of hedge funds in the financial markets. 
The maturing of the industry results in the growing interest and demand of additional 
investor groups. As can be seen in Figure 2, U.S. endowments increased their 
investments into hedge funds from 2 % of total assets in 2000 to 18 % of total assets in 
2007, based on Dollar-weighted average asset class allocation of total assets. 
“According to Pensions and Investments, the largest 200 U.S. defined-benefit pension 
plans invested $3.2 billion, or 0.1 percent of their assets, in hedge funds in 2000. This 
investment grew to $29.9 billion, or 0.8 percent of their assets, in 2005.” (Fung and 
Hsieh, 2006) The growing demand for hedge fund investment by institutional investors 
and increasing regulatory concerns have resulted into change of behavior of hedge 
funds. Once obscure investment vehicles are now becoming more transparent unveiling 
their performance history and risk exposures. Still as can be seen in Figure 3, the  
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Figure 1: Development of the number and Assets under management of hedge 
funds
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Figure 2: U.S. endowments investments into hedge funds
invested assets % of total assets
Source:  NACUBO Endowments study, various issues
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proportion of institutional investors except Funds of funds makes up less than 30 % of 
the total capital invested into hedge funds in 2005. The largest proportion of capital is 
still provided by wealthy individuals who may not require as much transparency as 
institutional investors and who have enough resources to find the best managers for 
their investments. On the other hand, the growing demand for hedge funds as well as 
the increasing role of the institutional investors has brought about a declining trend in 
the alpha part of the returns to investors. “Demand growth for alpha, coupled with the 
layers of fees charged by hedge fund managers and funds-of-hedge-fund managers, 
has led to a disproportionate share of returns in favor of product providers at the cost of 
investors.” (Fung and Hsieh, 2006) Hence, there naturally arises the question whether it 
is possible to achieve hedge fund-like returns without the extra fees connected with 
investing into hedge funds, as the product of manager skills and the main source of his 
remuneration – alpha – is declining in average over time. The answer to this question is 
probably a passive replication of hedge fund returns, which we will talk about in the next 
chapters.  
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To sum up, hedge fund industry has gone through different stages of its life 
cycle, starting by Jones’s private fund, gaining more importance on the financial 
markets with some setbacks and collapses and a rapid development in the previous 
decade. This development hasn’t only attracted more investors of different types, but 
has as well led to introduction of new hedge fund investment styles and strategies. 
Moreover, according to Fung and Hsieh (2006), the most recent trend in investment 
styles is a creation of multi-strategy hedge funds that represent another step in 
diversification of risk. Contrary to single-strategy funds, multi-strategy funds diversify 
risk of specific style/strategy by allocating assets among different strategies and thus 
avoiding even larger part of the risk.  
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3. Definition of hedge fund 
  As we could see in the previous section, hedge fund industry has developed 
into a heterogeneous entity. Nowadays hedge funds employ various strategies, when 
they transact in different markets using different investment tools and techniques. 
Hence, there is no generally accepted definition of hedge fund. However, there are 
some common characteristics, which may be used to distinguish hedge funds from 
other investment vehicles, especially mutual funds. One may say that hedge fund is 
“any investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional 
investment managers, and not widely available to the public.”1 (Bank of Japan, 2006) To 
be more precise, we should set out some basic characteristics of hedge funds. 
I. Qualified investors  
Usually hedge funds are open only to qualified investors, i.e. investors that have 
previous experience in investment on the financial markets and have the necessary 
skills and resources to assess the riskiness of the investment. Such investors are 
primarily high net worth individuals, institutional investors, endowments etc. The reason, 
why hedge funds are restricted to qualified investors is the possibility to employ larger 
variety of investment techniques and lower regulatory requirements. “In the United 
States, an investment fund must be open to a limited number of accredited investors in 
order to be exempt from direct regulation.”2 We will discuss these characteristics in the 
subsequent sections.    
Usually, hedge funds raise new capital by private rather than public offerings. 
Specialized research and consultant companies may offer the investment into hedge 
funds to their clients and help them assess the investment strategy based on the 
prospectus of a particular fund and choose the right one. The investor can only enter a 
                                              
1 This is quoted from the “Report of The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets on Hedge 
Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management” (1999)  
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_fund 
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fund in certain days of the month, usually month end. Moreover the minimum required 
investment in U.S. ranges from $ 100 000, which is meant as a restriction to allow the 
investment only for wealthy individuals or large institutions. Further, hedge fund 
investment is less liquid than mutual fund and is supposed to be middle to long term 
investment. Hedge funds stipulate so called lock-up period, which is the period after the 
starting date, while the investor is restricted to withdraw his investment. In addition, the 
termination of the investment is not so straightforward. Investor can withdraw his 
investment by termination of investment or distributions. Distributions are not so 
common since the realized returns are usually retained in the fund and reinvested. 
When the investor wants to terminate his investment, he needs to apply for the 
termination on specific days after giving a notice of application well before this day. “The 
period between the termination application date and pay-out date may exceed 60 days.” 
(Bank of Japan, 2006)  
Such strict restrictions on application for the investment and termination of the 
investment allow managers to take on longer investment horizons to satisfy the 
performance requirements of the clients. Moreover, qualified investors may not be in 
such urgent need of the invested funds as other “non-qualified” lower net-worth 
investors. Nevertheless, the current trend is to introduce the possibility of hedge fund 
investment to more retail-clients indirectly through tradable hedge fund indices or other 
replication clones.  
II. Investment techniques 
As we have mentioned before, hedge funds are subject to lower regulatory 
requirements. This rather loose approach of regulatory bodies concerning employed 
investment techniques allows hedge fund managers to make use of different investment 
tools such as derivatives like options, futures, forwards, swaps, and moreover can 
employ short selling and leverage.  
  9 
Short selling has been used ever since the beginning of the hedge fund industry 
and Jones based his investment strategy exactly on short selling of overvalued stocks. 
Short selling is defined as following: “The selling of a security that the seller does not 
own, or any sale that is completed by the delivery of a security borrowed by the seller.”3 
Short seller speculates on the decline of stock price and he profits from the difference 
between the sold price and the price he buys the stock after it went down and the fees 
of the broker that lent the stocks. Taken separately, it is investment technique as any 
other and takes the same risks as buying long. However, if an investor combines long 
positions with the short ones, he may reduce the risk of his portfolio and what is more 
important, his returns may be independent of the general market movements. The 
technique described above is called hedging and the whole hedge fund industry is 
named after it. The operational process of short selling is executed mainly through 
prime brokers, which additionally provide other services to hedge funds like settlement 
of trades and lending of cash. Even though many hedge funds employ short selling and 
hedging, there are many styles and strategies that don’t exploit this possibility. Further, 
many hedge funds transact in emerging and developing markets that don’t even allow 
for short selling, because they haven’t developed proper market institutions yet.  
Another investment tool used to hedge long positions is the use of derivatives. 
Derivative is defined as following: “In finance, a security whose price is dependent upon 
or derived from one or more underlying assets. The derivative itself is merely a contract 
between two or more parties. Its value is determined by fluctuations in the underlying 
asset.”4 Hence, derivative may be used on any financial asset like stock, bond, currency 
or even on the development of weather. The main types of derivatives are futures, 
forwards, options and swaps. Altogether, derivatives may be used as a substitute to 
short selling and if there are willing counterparties, they may be used even on emerging 
and developing countries, where there is no possibility of short selling. However, 
derivatives may be used on speculative purpose as well. In this case they are rather 
risky because of their intrinsic leverage. They allow investors to take large positions with 
                                              
3 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp 
4 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp 
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just small margin payments and hence gain large returns from small price movements. 
On the other hand, the price movement may go against the investor and then he 
realizes substantial losses. Another issue with derivatives is the pricing of a derivative. 
Many derivatives are traded only over-the-counter and hence the determination of their 
prices is rather difficult. Such a price uncertainty allows hedge funds to smooth out their 
returns artificially only by revaluation of the held derivatives. 
Finally, we came to the use of leverage. Leverage in investing is defined as 
following: “The use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital, such as margin, 
to increase the potential return of an investment.”5 Jones used leverage to multiply his 
hedged returns, since such returns are rather low without employing a lot of capital. 
Presently, more than two thirds of hedge funds employ leverage. However, the degree 
of leverage varies substantially among different styles of investment, with the highest 
leverage used by arbitrage strategies like fixed income arbitrage and by macro strategy 
funds, and the lowest leverage used by equity strategies funds. The degree of leverage 
thus varies from 1 to 2 times the equity to more than 10 times the equity, even though 
higher leverage is not so common. The use of leverage is sometimes required by the 
investment technique, where there are only small profit margins, which need to be 
multiplied to achieve reasonable profits. Hedge funds usually leverage their positions 
through the use of derivatives, margin buying and borrowing from their prime brokers. 
Nevertheless, the use of leverage may be quite risky all the more when the traded 
instruments are illiquid. To lower the risk connected with leverage, hedge funds must 
secure the provision of credit lines by prime brokers, banks and other financial 
intermediaries. 
III. Absolute return 
We have seen that hedge funds transact in different markets using different 
investment tools and techniques. Also, they differ from the mutual funds and other 
                                              
5 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp 
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investment trust in the performance measurement standards. While the performance of 
mutual funds is usually compared to the performance of equity or bond market indices, 
the performance of hedge funds is not compared to any kind of benchmark. The reason 
the performance is not benchmark to any common equity or bond market index is that 
hedge funds’ returns are supposed to be market neutral with only small correlation to 
the market trends. Hence, hedge funds should provide the investor with absolute 
returns, i.e. the returns are not compared relative to common market indices and in 
addition they should provide them with positive absolute returns in various market 
conditions. The shortcoming of absolute return performance measurement is that the 
investors have no possibility to compare the returns of hedge funds to some universal 
asset class and its development and trend, but are only reliant on the intra-industry 
comparison among different funds. This lack of performance benchmark should be 
resolved by the creation of passive hedge fund return replication indices that will provide 
an asset based track of returns.  
IV. Fees structure 
Another specific characteristic of hedge funds is their fees structure. Typical 
hedge fund has two layers of fees. The first layer is represented by the management 
fee, which is common to mutual funds and other investment trusts as well. Management 
fee is calculated annually as a percentage of net asset value of the managed fund. The 
fee ranges from 1 % to 5 % with 2 % being the standard management fee. The second 
layer is represented by the performance fee, which is specific for hedge funds. 
Performance fee is calculated as a percentage of funds realized as well as yet 
unrealized profits. The fee ranges from 10 % to 20 % and more with 20 % being the 
standard performance fee. Performance fees are supposed to align the interests of 
manager and investors, where investors are willing to pay larger fees for good 
performance of the fund. However, there has been a general criticism of performance 
fees, since they create incentives for short run profits and not for long run returns and 
hence increase short run risk taken by managers. To overcome this problem, many 
hedge funds apply high water mark provisions and sometimes hurdle fees. High water 
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mark modifies the performance fee calculation in the way, that performance fee is 
calculated only on the value of the fund that is higher that any historically achieved 
value of the fund. Although, many managers, who realized larger losses are rather keen 
on closing the fund and opening new one rather than managing without any 
performance fee until they make up the losses. Hurdle rate fees are fees that are either 
calculate above some benchmark, like Libor rate or T-bill rate, or are calculated as the 
total performance fees only in the case this benchmark was achieved.  
V. Legal structure and regulation 
“A hedge fund is a vehicle for holding and investing the funds of its investors. The 
fund itself is not a genuine business.”6 The actual business is the investment manager, 
who manages the portfolio of the fund. The legal entity of the vehicle depends largely on 
the tax and regulatory environment of its investors and of the fund alone. About fifty 
percent of hedge funds are registered off-shore in tax heaven countries exactly because 
they are trying to avoid paying taxes on the increase of net asset value. The legal entity 
of off-shore funds is corporate fund and these funds are focused mainly on “non-U.S. 
investors or U.S. entities that do not pay tax”7. In U.S. the legal entity of the funds is 
predominantly limited partnership, because of its tax advantages for U.S. investors. The 
investment manager is the general partner who typically invests large amount of his 
own wealth into the fund, and individual investors are limited partners. Moreover, to 
realize tax gains for investors with different tax environments, hedge funds use special 
structure, where there are two kinds of funds. First, there are feeder funds, which will 
collect the assets from investors in particular tax environment and then invest all assets 
into master fund. The manager then manages only one fund except of many funds 
focused on different tax environments. Another characteristic of hedge funds is that they 
are typically open-ended funds. This means they issue additional partnership shares or 
interests and that the investor may redeem his investment based on the conditions 
                                              
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_fund 
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_fund 
  13 
mentioned above. Nevertheless, many investment strategies are limited in the volume 
of invested capital and the funds don’t accept new investors.  
   Hedge funds are regulated from two sides, from the side of investment 
manager and from the side of the vehicle. In this section we will consider only U.S. 
jurisdiction. Since managers are basically investment advisers, they are liable to 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and must register with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). However, there are some exceptions to the commitment 
of registration and not all advisers have to register. “The Act exempts an adviser from 
registration if it (i) has had fewer than fifteen clients during the preceding twelve months, 
(ii) does not hold itself out generally to the public as an investment adviser, and (iii) is 
not an adviser to any registered investment company.”8 Once an adviser is exempt, the 
SEC states that they “do not file registration forms with us identifying who they are, do 
not have to maintain business records in accordance with our rules, do not have to 
adopt or implement compliance programs or codes of ethics, and are not subject to 
Commission oversight.”9 However after the rapid growth of the industry and failure of 
some large hedge funds in the early 2000’s there has been an attempt to change and 
amend the act in 2004. However, the change was challenged in court by hedge fund 
manager Phillip Goldstein and in June 2006 was overturned and sent back to SEC for 
revision. “In addition, if the investment manager engages in commodity futures trading, 
registration with the Commodity Futures Exchange Commission (CFTC) is required 
under the Commodity Exchange Act. However, this registration is also exempted if 
certain conditions, such as the number of clients being not more than 15, are satisfied.” 
(Bank of Japan, 2006) Further, there are other reporting requirements connected with 
trading activities (large positions of public companies) and margin requirements.   
 The regulation of vehicle is based on the Investment Company Act of 1940 
according to which it must be registered with SEC as an investment company. However, 
once again there exist some exceptions for the registration, which are exploited by 
                                              
8 http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm 
9 http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm 
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hedge funds. The registration is not required “if the fund makes private offerings for 100 
or less investors or if it makes private offerings only for investors who are qualified 
purchasers10. (…) Furthermore, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has a provision 
specifying that investment companies with 500 or more investors that have assets in 
excess of 10 million U.S. dollars are required to register with SEC.” (Bank of Japan, 
2006) So hedge funds that meet these conditions are not required for registration and 
thus are not restricted on the use of short selling and other investment techniques. 
All in all, the legal structure of hedge funds aims to avoid as much regulation as 
possible to make use of different investment techniques and fundraising activities. 
Nevertheless, with the rising importance of hedge fund industry, the regulatory bodies 
are more vigilant to the development of the industry and misconduct activities of some 
hedge funds, and they pursue to impose more regulation on the industry. But on the 
other hand the regulators acknowledged that the regulation should remain minor and 
the hedge fund industry should rely more on internal nonbinding principles. As a matter 
of fact, unlike in the beginnings of the industry, nowadays, hedge funds are more open 
to their investors and regulators, even though they are still preserving a lot of their 
freedom.  
 
 
 
                                              
10 Individuals and asset management companies with investment assets of 5 million U.S. dollars 
or more. 
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4. Hedge fund strategies and styles 
The hedge fund industry has evolved into a heterogeneous entity. With the 
invention of new investment instruments and techniques the number of hedge fund 
strategies has expanded significantly. The strategies differ on a number of factors. First, 
they differ in the asset class they transact with, i.e. if they are focused on equities, fixed 
income, commodities or currencies. Second, they can transact in different markets or 
sectors of the market like emerging markets or technology sector. Third, there are 
different approaches to the management of the portfolio with one group of funds 
managed discretionary, where the investment decisions are made by the manager, and 
the other group of funds managed systematically and also called quants, where the 
investment decisions are made according to mathematical models and where IT 
systems are used extensively. Lastly, they differ in the approach to the risk, with some 
funds betting on the market trends or following actual trends and others trying to stay 
market neutral. In spite of the differences of individual strategies, there is a trend of 
diversification across different styles and strategies to reduce the risk hedge funds are 
exposed to. 
In the following section, we will describe the fundamental strategies that are more 
or less used in the industry. The section uses description directly from TASS11 
documentation as was disclosed in the paper of Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2006, with some 
additional notes made by the author were appropriate.   
Convertible arbitrage – this strategy is based on simultaneous purchase of 
convertible securities and short sale of common stocks of the company. “Positions are 
designed to generate profits from the fixed income security as well as the short sale of 
stock, while protecting principal from market moves.” (Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2006) 
Hence, this strategy profits from relative value arbitrage opportunity. 
                                              
11 TASS database is one of the leading hedge fund databases  
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Dedicated short bias – this strategy is based on taking short positions in mostly 
equities and derivatives. “The strategy is to maintain net short as opposed to pure short 
exposure. The short bias of a manager's portfolio must be constantly greater than zero 
to be classified in this category.” (Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2006) The strategy has also 
evolved from purely dedicated short sellers to net short sellers after the long bull market 
in 1990’s. This strategy profits from directional bets of the manager. 
Emerging markets – this strategy is based on investing into equities or fixed 
income instruments in emerging markets. Since these markets are usually only 
developing and have restrictions on short selling or derivatives are not available, the 
funds tend to be long only. Once again, this strategy profits from directional bets. 
Equity market neutral – this strategy is based on investing long and short in 
matched portfolios of equities within a country. “Market neutral portfolios are designed 
to be either beta or currency neutral, or both. Well-designed portfolios typically control 
for industry, sector, market capitalization, and other exposures.” (Hasanhodzic and Lo, 
2006) Market neutral investment strives to hedge away all the systematic risk exposure, 
while at the same time profiting from the specific risks of selected stocks. The strategy 
bets on the out/underperformance of the picked securities over the market/sector and 
uses leverage to enhance returns. This strategy makes profits from relative value 
opportunities. 
Event driven – this strategy is based on the investment into special events in the 
life of a company as merger, restructuration or liquidation of a company. There are three 
main subcategories of this strategy – risk arbitrage, distressed securities and regulation 
D. Risk arbitrage aims at merger events and is based on buying the stocks of the 
company being acquired that is sometimes combined with shorting the stocks of the 
acquirer company. Distressed securities strategy trades all kinds of securities of 
companies in reorganization or bankruptcy that are traded with discounts to their value 
because of the distress. Finally, the regulation D strategy buys stocks of micro and 
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small-cap public companies that are raising funds in private markets and are sometimes 
hedge by convertibility options or look-back provisions. 
Fixed income arbitrage – this strategy is based on investing into interest rate 
securities or its derivatives. It exploits price anomalies between related securities, 
mostly trading globally and seeks to generate steady returns with low volatility. “This 
category includes interest rate swap arbitrage, U.S. and non-U.S. government bond 
arbitrage, forward yield curve arbitrage, and mortgage-backed securities arbitrage.” 
(Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2006) This strategy profits from relative value arbitrage 
opportunities. The best-known hedge fund employing this strategy was Long-Term 
Capital Management with two Nobel Prize laureates Myron Scholes and Robert C. 
Merton in the board of directors. The fund employed complex mathematical models to 
exploit arbitrage opportunities in fixed income. After initial success with annualized 
returns over 40 %, the fund lost $ 4,6 billion in four months during 1998 and was folded 
in 2000. The fund became an example for the potential inherent risks of hedge funds. 
Global macro – this strategy is based on investing in the global capital or 
derivative markets. It aims to exploit profitable opportunities of global economic trends 
and events, such as interest rate or currency shifts. “The portfolios of these funds can 
include stocks, bonds, currencies, and commodities in the form of cash or derivatives 
instruments.” (Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2006) Moreover the strategy makes use of 
extensive leverage. It profits from directional bets on global markets. The famous fund 
of George Soros together with some other funds is supposedly responsible for the 
forced withdrawal of pound sterling in 1992, after taking large short positions to bet on 
devaluation of pound sterling.  
Long/Short equity hedge – this strategy is based on both investing in long and 
short positions in equity markets. Unlike equity market neutral, the objective of this 
strategy is not to be market neutral but rather, the funds may shift between net long and 
net short positions with most funds having long bias. There are different styles of this 
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strategy with some funds focusing on a specific region, such as U.S. equities, or on 
specific sector, such as technology and some funds investing in growth or value stocks. 
The positions are usually hedged by futures contracts or options. “There is wide 
variation in the degree to which managers prioritize seeking high returns (which may 
involve concentrated and leveraged portfolios) and seeking low volatility (which involves 
more diversification and hedging).”12 This strategy profits from directional bets on picked 
portfolios of stocks. 
Managed futures – this strategy is based on investing in financial and 
commodity futures markets and currency markets. “The managers are usually referred 
to as Commodity Trading Advisors, or CTAs.” (Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2006) The funds 
usually employ trend following approach with the systematic or discretionary approach 
to the management of the fund. This strategy profits from global directional bets.  
Multi strategy – this strategy is based on investing among several principal 
hedge fund strategies. The funds strive to diversify their portfolios by investing in 
different strategies and exploiting profit opportunities in response to changing market 
conditions by allocating their funds to more profitable strategies. This strategy profits 
from relative value profit opportunities.  
Funds of hedge funds – a special kind of hedge funds rather than a strategy. 
These funds, so called multi manager funds, invest in other hedge funds. By investing 
into other hedge funds, the funds of hedge funds diversify across the hedge funds and 
hence aim to reduce risk, and further provide investor with the possibility to invest in a 
portfolio of hedge funds that was picked by the manager. Moreover, they carry out due 
diligence, provide experience management of the portfolio and other research activities. 
However, funds of hedge funds impose another layer of management and performance 
fees, usually 1,5 % and 10 – 30 % respectively, on top of the fees of individual hedge 
                                              
12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_/_short_equity 
  19 
funds, which further reduces the returns of such investment and may not always provide 
returns for as large fees.   
As we can see there is large variety of strategies that hedge funds employ in 
their investment decisions. Figure 4 shows the risk-return characteristics of different 
strategies employed by individual hedge funds. The figure indicates that investors may 
choose among different tradeoffs depending on their risk aversion. There is a bulk of 
strategies in the blue circle showing similar risk-return characteristics. As we can see, 
the majority of them are strategies employing relative value arbitrage, with the exception 
of Event driven funds that employ the arbitrage strategy only partially and Funds of 
hedge funds that are supposed to be low risk funds. Directionally oriented funds provide 
quite dispersed risk-return performance with two outliers Emerging markets that provide 
large returns with large volatility and Dedicated short bias funds that have been affected 
by long bull market in the 1990’s. The best performance according to the annualized  
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Sharpe ratios for the period was provided by Convertible arbitrage and Fixed income 
arbitrage funds, with the values of Sharpe ratio 2,7 and 2,05 respectively. On the other 
hand, the poorest performance according to this measure was provided by Dedicated 
short bias and Managed futures funds, with Sharpe ratios 0,25 and 0,67 respectively. 
 
The Figure 5 above depicts the historical development of the changes in the 
prevailing strategies. There are several larger shifts discernible from the figure. First, the 
prominent place of Macro strategy in the beginning of the 1990’s has vanished being a 
result of LTCM and Asian crises in late 1990’s. Second, both the Long/Short equity and 
Event driven strategies have gained on importance during the decade and are now the 
most commonly employed strategies. Third, we may observe the arrival of the Multi 
strategy funds in the early 2000’s and the immediate importance they gained. Hence, 
we may see that the industry reflects closely the changing market conditions and new 
investment trends. With the most commonly used strategy that manages the most 
assets, Long/Short equity strategy, employed at the birth of the industry by A. W. Jones, 
has once again returned to its prominent place in the industry.    
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Figure 5: Development of relative proportion of invested AuM for different 
investment styles (in % of AuM)
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Source: Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index, Sector weights 
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5. Alpha versus beta controversy 
Recently, there has been a growing debate about the sources of hedge fund 
returns. Basically, there are two opposite factions – the ones that according to the 
results of substantial research claim that most of the returns generated by hedge funds 
come from systematic exposures, i.e. betas, and on the other side the ones that claim 
that the returns of hedge funds are generated from the larger part by the skills of the 
managers and the specific techniques they employ. According to alpha protagonists, 
hedge funds provide absolute returns, i.e. returns that are independent of general 
market movements. This debate is legitimate, since hedge fund managers claim that 
their returns are independent of market movements and they charge high fees for these 
returns. Thus, if not every manager is able to provide genuine alpha, than it is important 
for the investors to distinguish among them and to pay only fees for the provided risk 
exposures.  
Many hedge funds sell their alpha in a bundle together with beta exposures to 
markets. To be clearer, we should define, what we mean by alpha and beta. We will 
follow the approach of L. Jaeger and Wagner, and C. Asness. There are number of 
definitions of alpha. “Alpha is a risk-adjusted measure of the so-called active return on 
an investment. It is a common measure of assessing an active manager's performance 
as it is the return in excess of a benchmark index.”13 This definition comes from the 
capital asset pricing model, where alpha in fact means the intercept of the security 
characteristic line. Jaeger and Wagner define alpha as “the part of the return that 
cannot be explained by the exposure to systematic risk factors in the global capital 
markets and is thus the return part that stems from the unique ability and skill set of the 
hedge fund manager.” (Jaeger and Wagner, 2005) They argue, however, that the 
conventional risk measures are inappropriate to truly identify beta exposures of hedge 
funds. They argue that hedge fund beta is different from traditional beta. Asness sums 
up: “If the specific return is available only to a handful investors and the scheme of 
extracting it cannot be simply specified by a systematic process, then it is most likely 
                                              
13 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_(investment) 
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real alpha. If it can be specified in a systematic way, but it involves nonconventional 
techniques such as short selling, leverage and the use of derivatives (techniques which 
are often used to specifically characterize hedge funds), then it is possibly beta, 
however in an alternative form, which we will refer to as “alternative beta”. In the hedge 
fund industry “alternative beta” is often sold as alpha, but is not real alpha as defined 
here (and elsewhere). If finally extracting the returns does not require any of these 
special “hedge fund techniques” but rather “long only investing”, then it is “traditional 
beta”.” (Jaeger and Wagner, 2005) Hence, the traditional investment strategies of long 
only are exposed directly to the various markets, while the hedge funds are moreover 
exposed indirectly through different investment techniques and instruments. This 
indirect exposure requires specific tools, but may not require special skills and thus 
should not be considered as true alpha. Consequently, the investors may want to know, 
what they are paying the high fees for, if it is the genius of the manager or just the ability 
to use unconstrained dynamic investment techniques and still provide market exposure.  
Further the recent research has shown that the alpha part of the hedge fund 
returns has declined on average in the recent period. Fung et al. have scrutinized the 
returns of Funds of hedge funds. They found out that “there exist significant cross-
sectional differences in the risk-adjusted performance (henceforth ‘alpha’) of FoFs, 
suggesting substantial differences in managerial ability. Second, the managers who 
produce alpha receive high and positive inflows of capital, while the rest have 
experienced on average zero capital inflows.” (Fung et al., 2006) The reason for 
declining alpha may be found in the recent growth of the industry and the large inflows 
of assets into the industry. With more hedge funds, there are more managers that 
cannot provide for their fees and moreover many strategies are constrained in the 
capacity of employed capital and thus cannot provide infinite returns. Still as we may 
see from the results of Fung et al., the true alpha managers are found by the investors 
and receive further capital inflows.  
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Another test appropriate for finding true alpha is to test the persistence of the 
returns of hedge fund managers. If the returns are persistent during longer time periods, 
we could presume that the manager possesses skills rather then luck and that he 
provides the investor with alpha. Malkiel and Saha (2005) have estimated the 
performance persistence based on the data from TASS database. They used the 
following method similar to Agarwal and Naik, and Brown and Goetzmann (2001): “We 
called a hedge fund manager who realized a return larger than the median hedge fund 
return for that year a “winner.” A “loser” was a fund that realized a below-median return. 
For the previous year’s winners, we then asked whether these funds were winners 
(winners-to-winners) or losers (winners-to-losers) in the next year.” (Malkiel and Saha, 
2005) The results of their analysis showed that for the period 1996 – 2003 there is on 
average persistence in returns of around 51,5 % (or 54,7 % with the exclusion of 
defunct funds), which ranges in different year from 39,6 % to 61,4 % (43,9 % to 68,7 %). 
Hence on average there is about half of the hedge funds that provide alpha persistence 
in two consecutive years, with the caveat that median returns may not provide the best 
benchmark for the market return (exposure). 
To evaluate the basic market exposure of different hedge fund strategies, we will 
run a simple OLS monthly regression of the returns of these strategies on two market 
factors, monthly returns of S&P 500 index and J.P. Morgan’s U.S. Government bond 
index. The results of this regression can be seen in Table 1. Two observations are 
suggesting themselves. First, almost all strategies possess statistically significant 
exposure of different magnitudes to the equity factor. Second, almost all strategies 
provide statistically significant alpha. However, to be critical, the size of alpha would be 
much smaller in an elaborated regression that would account for more specific factors 
and if we would account for some risk-free benchmark rate.         
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Table 1: Exposure of hedge fund indices to traditional market factors 
Hedge fund strategy Annualized alpha S&P 500 beta 
JP U.S. 
beta 
Adjusted 
R2 
Convertible arbitrage 7,96 % 0,05 0,01 1,5 % 
Dedicated short bias 6,43 % - 0,90 0,23 57,6 % 
Emerging markets 7,14 % 0,52 - 0,19 22,1 % 
Equity market neutral 8,44 % 0,07 0,06 13,7 % 
Event driven 9,99 % 0,21 - 0,09 30,7 % 
Fixed income arbitrage 5,78 % 0,01 0,03 - 0,6 % 
Global macro 8,68 % 0,19 0,49 9,3 % 
Long/Short equity hedge 7,18 % 0,42 0,15 35,3 % 
Managed futures 3,69 % - 0,06 0,62 5,5 % 
Multi strategy 9,08 % 0,04 - 0,02 0,7 % 
Hedge fund index 6,98 % 0,27 0,21 24,9 % 
* Individual strategies are represented by the respective indices from Credit Suisse Tremont for 
the period 01/1994 – 12/2007. JP US stands for J.P. Morgan’s U.S. Government bond index. Annualized 
alpha was computed as 12 times the intercept of the OLS monthly regression. Values in bold are 
statistically significant on 95 % level of significance.    
If we took beta as the measure of the exposure to the market factors, the 
strategies with largest exposure to the equity factor will be Dedicated short bias, 
Emerging markets and Long/Short equity hedge, respectively. Not surprisingly, we find 
that the exposure of dedicated shorts is negative, but what is more surprising is the 
extent of the exposure, which is 90 %. What is bit more surprising is the extent of 
exposure of Emerging markets strategies that are supposed to invest in emerging and 
developing markets. However, it could be explained by the close correlation among 
these markets and the U.S. equities market. Another equity focused strategy with high 
exposure is the Long/Short equity hedge that is biased more on the long side. The 
common characteristic of these three strategies is that they employ directional bets on 
markets and thus are exposed more to the general trends than relative value funds. 
Equity market neutral funds are doing quite a good job with only minor exposure to the 
equity market. On the other hand, there are only two strategies with statistically 
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significant exposure to fixed income factor, Managed futures and Global macro. 
However, the magnitudes of the exposures may be misleading, since the values of 
Adjusted R2 are rather small and there are other factors better explaining these 
strategies. Once again, both strategies take directional bets on the markets. 
Managers running funds based on directional strategies claim that they can 
predict the development of the markets and profit from the forecasted trends. Hence, 
these managers should possess good market timing skills and should be accordingly 
rewarded for these skills, since they add alpha value to the returns. We should test 
these market timing abilities based on the approach of Fung and Hsieh (1997). First we 
shall sort the monthly returns of the market factor and hedge fund strategies from the 
worst returns to the best returns. Next we will divide these sorted returns into 4 states of 
the market with the first state capturing the worst performance, second state the second 
worst performance, third state the second best performance and the fourth state 
capturing the best performance of the market factor. Accordingly we will then calculate 
the average returns for the market factor as well as for the individual strategies of each 
state. The results can be seen in the Figures 6 to 13. If a manager is a good market 
timer and can predict the movements of the market, than he should reduce his 
exposures to the falling markets (unless he shorts them) and increase his exposure to 
the rising markets. The first four figures show the results for the equity market factor. At 
first we will analyze the three strategies with the highest exposure according to the 
previous regression. Dedicated short bias displays inverse returns to that of S&P 500, 
but doesn’t show any signs of market timing abilities, since it didn’t reduce its exposure 
in up market. Emerging markets and Long/Short equities resemble to each other as 
they reduce their exposure in falling markets, take on the rising markets, but don’t 
expose themselves fully in the highest booms, even though these two strategies are 
exposed the most to the booming market. Hence, they show some market timing 
abilities. The relative value arbitrage strategies retain their returns in all states of the 
equity market almost the same and hence they stand to their arbitrage characteristic. 
The remaining strategies are well protected against the falling markets, while making 
use of rebounding markets and not exposing themselves too much in booming markets.  
  26 
 
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Figure 6: S&P 500 states vs. hedge fund strategies
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Figure 7: S&P 500 states vs. hedge fund strategies
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Figure 8: S&P 500 states vs. hedge fund strategies
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Figure 9: S&P 500 states vs. hedge fund strategies
S&P 500 Long/Short equity hedge Dedicated short bias
  27 
-1,5%
-1,0%
-0,5%
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Figure 10: JP U.S. states vs. hedge fund strategies
JP U.S. Convertible arbitrage Equity market neutral Multi strategy
-1,5%
-1,0%
-0,5%
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Figure 11: JP U.S. states vs. hedge fund strategies
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Figure 12: JP U.S. states vs. hedge fund strategies
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Figure 13: JP U.S. states vs. hedge fund strategies
JP U.S. Dedicated short bias Long/Short equity hedge
  28 
The other four figures show the results for the fixed income market factor. 
Managed futures reduce their exposure in falling markets, while taking on more 
exposure while the markets are rising and therefore show market timing ability. 
However the second strategy Global macro doesn’t seem to follow the fixed income 
market although it provides high returns during rising and booming markets. A 
surprising observation is the behavior of Dedicated short bias, when it follows the 
market in the lower two states and even outmatching the falling market, while tracking 
the rising market only to a small extent. This, however, could be explained by the 
inverse movement of the equities and fixed income markets in extreme states. Relative 
value strategies once again retain the same level of returns in all states and thus are not 
correlated to the market. The remaining strategies again don’t show much correlation to 
the market with the exception of Emerging markets that displays negative returns in the 
booming market.  
As we have seen, many hedge fund strategies are exposed to different traditional 
markets and they can not always prove that their exposure is tactical to enhance the 
returns. On top of these exposures, there are other types of exposures specific to the 
hedge fund industry and the liberty to use different investment tools. Still, hedge funds 
sell these alternative betas in one package together with the true alpha of their skills. 
Moreover, the true alpha seems to become more scarce and harder to find. 
Consequently, there may arise the question, whether it is possible to create hedge fund 
like returns without the imposition of the high hedge fund fees. The suggesting answer 
may be the creation of synthetic hedge funds. The tool to create such synthetic funds is 
the replication of hedge fund returns, which is the main topic of this article. We will 
return to this issue shortly after short digression on hedge fund indices, which are 
another possibility for the investors to invest in hedge fund like returns.    
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6. Hedge fund indices 
The demand for a benchmark of hedge funds has led to creation of hedge fund 
indices. As opposed to absolute return investment, this demand requires more relative 
returns, so that the investors could easily compare the results of their managers to a 
bucket of peer managers. Consequently, mostly the hedge fund database vendors have 
decided to create indices based on the data from the funds that already submitted to 
their databases. There are two kinds of hedge fund indices, investable and non-
investable. The non-investable indices are paradoxically considered to reflect the 
industry better than the investable indices, since they are usually composed of more 
funds. The investable indices are composed of funds that are open to new investment 
and can be sold as well and that accept the conditions of the index provider. As these 
conditions may be cumbersome for some hedge funds their supply is rather limited. 
Moreover, hedge funds that are successful or closed to new investment don’t have the 
incentive to submit to such databases and indices. The construction of indices varies 
among the providers and hence we will shortly describe four main hedge fund index 
providers.  
Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index – This index is compiled by Credit 
Suisse Tremont Index LLC and is the largest asset-weighted14 hedge fund index started 
in 1994 encompassing 481 funds. It is a non-investable index, where the composite 
index is comprised of 10 style-based sector indices. The funds are drawn from the 
Credit Suisse/Tremont database of approximately 5 000 funds and then selected 
according to proprietary rule based criteria and reselected quarterly. Each included fund 
must meet four basic criteria – monthly NAV reporting, audited financial statements, at 
least $ 50 million under management, one-year track record (exceptions for large funds 
with more than $ 500 million under management). The index excludes Funds of hedge 
funds but includes closed funds and is supposed to represent at least 85 % of AUM in 
selection universe for each sector. It is calculated on monthly bases net of all fees.  
                                              
14 Asset-weighted indices tend to put more weight on large funds and top performing funds, which 
increase their assets, while putting less weight on worse performing funds that reduced their assets. 
  30 
Hedge Fund Research indices – The indices are compiled by Hedge Fund 
Research Inc and are divided into investable and non-investable indices. HFRI Monthly 
Indices – are equal-weighted15 non-investable indices started in January 1990 
encompassing over 2 000 funds. The composite index is comprised of 6 sub-indexes, 
which are moreover comprised of other sub-indexes. New funds are included on a 
regular basis as HFR identifies candidates for inclusion. The criteria for inclusion are – 
monthly net of all fees reporting in USD, at least $ 50 million under management or 
have been actively trading for at least 12 months. Funds of hedge funds are not 
included into composite index. The index is calculated three times per month net of all 
fees. HFRX Indices – are investable indices started in April 2003 encompassing over 
55 funds. There are 4 general indices with other strategy specific sub-indices, where the 
index weighting is either representative optimization16 or equal-weighting. New funds 
are included on quarterly bases and new funds must be open to transparent investment. 
The criteria for inclusion are – at least monthly net of fees reporting, at least $ 50 million 
under management or have been actively trading for at least 24 months. Most of the 
indices are calculated daily, all monthly.  
Eurekahedge indices – The indices are compiled by Eurekahedge Pte Ltd. and 
are equally weighted indices started in January 2000. The company provides a suite of 
200+ non-investable hedge fund indices comprised of different regional, strategic and 
size of funds drawn from a database of over 7 000 funds. The indices are recalculated 
and funds are reselected typically on a daily bases. 
FTSE Hedge indices – The indices are compiled by FTSE International Ltd and 
are weighted by investability. They broad index consists of up to 40 hedge funds and 
has started in January 2004. It is an investable index, where the broad index is 
comprised of 11 sub-indices. The funds are drawn from FTSE Hedge fund database of 
about 8 000 funds and must meet the following criteria of inclusion – monthly reporting 
                                              
15 Equal-weighted (fund-weighted) indices put the same weight on each fund in the index, which 
decreases the bias towards large funds especially for strategies with small number of funds.  
16 Representative optimization is proprietary weighting method based on asset-weighting with the 
focus to achieve representative performance of hedge fund universe. 
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with a minimum of quarterly liquidity screening, independent audited financial 
statements, at least $ 50 million of unleveraged assets under management, a minimum 
two year track record and be open to new investors. The indices are recalculated each 
day. 
The shortcoming of all hedge fund indices lies in the proprietary and obscure 
nature of hedge fund investing. Unlike traditional equity indices, which constituents are 
obliged to provide information to regulatory bodies and investors, hedge funds are not 
obliged to provide information to anyone. Hence it is almost impossible, all the more for 
individual database vendors, to compile all information about hedge funds and their 
returns for the whole industry. Consequently, each index provider tracks only limited 
proportion of the industry and thereby there is rather substantial performance deviation 
among individual indices. Another issue with hedge fund indices is the biases they are 
usually exposed to. In the next section we will briefly describe them. 
 Selection bias – This bias occurs precisely from the above mentioned obscure 
nature of hedge fund investing. “This bias arises when the hedge funds in a database 
are not representative of the universe of hedge funds.” (Fung and Hsieh, 2006) “The 
cause may be that entry to a database is a voluntary decision. Because hedge funds 
are prohibited from public solicitation, they can be marketed only through word of 
mouth. And one way of spreading information about a fund is by belonging to a 
database purchased by interested investors.” (Fung and Hsieh, 2004) So it is up to the 
selection of individual hedge funds to participate in a database or index. The question 
is, whether the performance of such hedge funds is representative of the whole 
universe, or whether it is under or overestimating the true performance. On one hand, 
many successful funds can attract sufficient number of investors and don’t need to be 
publicized in a database or index. On the other hand, the funds that have had poor 
performance don’t want to show off either. Hence, it is difficult to estimate the 
magnitude and direction of this bias. 
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Survivorship bias – The cause for this bias is that the databases only reflect the 
returns of the existing hedge funds providing return information to them. However, they 
do not cover the information from defunct hedge funds that ceased to provide 
information. There are two reasons for a fund to stop providing information. First, the 
fund produced poor performance and had to be liquidated. Such funds tend to have 
lower returns than the live funds. Second, the fund produced at least as good 
performance as the other live funds, but has closed to new investment for whatever 
reason or just stopped reporting. These funds do not bring negative survivorship bias. 
Survivorship bias is measured as the difference in the average returns for live funds 
against the average returns for all (live + defunct) funds. Nevertheless, on average, 
defunct funds tend to have poorer performance then the live funds. According to 
academic research and the Table 2, survivorship bias is estimated to range from 2 % to 
4 % a year for hedge funds. On the other hand, survivorship bias in mutual fund industry 
is estimated to range only from 0,5 % to 1,5 % a year, which might be used as a 
benchmark for mature industry. On top of that, hedge funds attrition rate, even though 
decreasing, are multiples of that of mutual funds. Malkiel and Saha (2005) have 
estimated the attrition rate, as the rate of exiting funds to existing funds, to range from 
13,6 % to almost 27 % for the period 1994 – 2004, as opposed to the attrition rate of 
mutual funds ranging from 2,5 % to 8,2 % for the same period. These differences may 
as well account for the larger survivorship bias in hedge fund returns. Although with the 
rapid development of the industry and increasing inflows of new capital, there might be 
a reduction in survivorship bias. The reason for reduction is that a larger proportion of 
defunct funds will stop reporting because they would close the funds for new investment 
and moreover, larger number of below average performing funds would find sufficient 
amount of capital to stay alive. Hence, only smaller proportion of funds with poor 
performance would create negative survivorship bias.  
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Table 2: Average annual return for live and defunct funds for the period 1994 – 2004 
Type of fund TASS database (%) 
HFR database 
(%) 
CISDM database 
(%) 
Live 14,4 14,3 15,5 
Live + defunct 12,0 12,5 13,1 
Live + defunct 
(excluding first 14 months) 10,5 11,2 11,6 
Survivorship bias 2,4 1,8 2,4 
Backfill bias 1,5 1,4 1,5 
 Source: Fung and Hsieh (2006) based on the data from TASS, HFR and CISDM 
Backfill bias – This bias is connected with the incubation period of a hedge fund 
before entering a database or index. New hedge funds undergo an incubation period of 
some time before they decide to enter a database. However, most of the funds would 
only enter a database, if they have achieved good performance in the incubation period. 
Hence, they would have better chance to attract new investors, then if they would enter 
a database with poor performance history during this period. When a new fund enters a 
database, this performance history prior to the entry date is backfilled and thus creates 
the backfill bias, which biases the returns upwards. However, there is a different case of 
new entrant into database. Many hedge funds have provided data to another database 
or have just decided to enter a database. In this case, it is important, that the new 
database backfills the whole performance history since the inception of the hedge 
funds, otherwise it would be exposed to the backfill bias. The Table 2 provides an 
estimate of this bias computed by Fung and Hsieh. They decided to take into account 
first 14 months prior to entering for the reason of the second case we mentioned above. 
The estimated value is 1,5 %, nearly the same for all three databases.  
Liquidation bias – This bias occurs when a hedge fund goes into liquidation and 
stops reporting to the database prior to the liquidation. Hence, there is an upward bias 
in the returns of defunct funds. According to Fung and Hsieh (2006), this bias is difficult 
to estimate, since database vendors do not follow the returns of the funds up to the 
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liquidation. However, Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft estimated the liquidating 
return to be 0,7 %. 
Together, various biases account for more than 4 % of average annual returns. 
This value should participate mostly on the estimated values of alpha, virtually 
decreasing alpha to more reasonable levels. Further, there are different performance 
results for indices used solely on benchmarking purposes and the ones used for 
investment. Investable indices tend to be outperformed by their respective non-
investable counterparts. All these issues invoke the questions of suitability of hedge 
fund indexes as investment tools or to look for another option. There are two options to 
hedge fund indexes. First, actively managed Funds of hedge funds provide comparable 
level of diversification and returns as indices. Yet their fees are substantially higher, the 
diversification is usually lower and based on discretionary decision making. On top of 
that, hedge fund indices may provide more target oriented products (like different 
strategies or regions) that are easier to access and may be more appropriate for 
institutional investors, since they are passive rule based investments. The second 
option is the creation of synthetic funds based on hedge fund return replication. We will 
scrutinize this option in the following chapter.   
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7. Hedge fund return replication 
In recent years, there has been a growing literature on hedge fund replication 
strategies and a growing interest of financial industry about this topic. Hedge fund 
replication is viewed as a substitution or complimentary product to proper investment 
into hedge funds. Unlike true hedge funds, synthetic hedge funds created by hedge 
fund return replication provide the investor with passive rule based investment, which is 
transparent and provides additional liquidity. On the other hand, the investors 
subscribing to hedge funds must rely on the obscure investment strategies of the 
managers and moreover need to stick with the same manager for a long lock-up period 
and additional time required for the withdrawal of funds. Further, the fees connected 
with the synthetic hedge funds are considerably smaller than that of hedge funds. 
Hence, many investors may rather decide invest into these synthetic products, the 
constitution of which may be more appropriate for them (for example institutional 
investors). Synthetic hedge fund as an investment option is not the only utilization of 
hedge fund replication. The replication may be used to create benchmark tools applied 
to evaluate the performance of individual hedge funds with a benchmark based on 
market returns rather then some median hedge fund performance.  
Before further discussion, we should first define hedge fund return replication. 
“Put simply, hedge fund return replication is about generating hedge fund-like returns by 
mechanically trading traditional asset classes. The idea is not, as some commentators 
seem to think, to replicate the performance of the ‘best’ hedge funds in the business. 
More modestly, the goal is to replicate the average.” (Kat, 2007) So, the hedge fund 
return replication may be defined as a trading strategy that will provide hedge fund-like 
returns by investing into traditional (or moreover some alternative) asset classes. The 
objective of the replication is to replicate the beta component of hedge fund returns, as 
decomposed in equation (1) below. As we have seen in previous discussion some 
hedge fund strategies are quite exposed to market factors. Thus, the beta component 
should provide the exposure to both traditional and alternative factors and hence is 
more reliable than the alpha component that depends on the skills of particular 
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manager. However, many replication strategies don’t only try to replicate the average 
hedge funds, but aim to replicate the returns of individual hedge funds, rather then 
some mean index value.  
 
Where Rt represents the hedge fund return, F represents the traditional factors like equity of 
fixed income indices, AF represents alternative factors like non-linear option portfolios, futures swaps, 
etc. 
There are a couple of replication strategies that differ in the concept of 
replication, with some focusing on the replication of hedge fund performance and some 
on replication of distribution of hedge fund returns over some period of time. We will 
briefly describe the main strategies in the following sections. 
I. Factor based approach 
This approach is based on the breakthrough work of Sharpe on his asset class 
factor model, which he used to describe the styles of mutual funds. He described his 
model as “a special case of the generic type. In such a model each factor represents 
the return on an asset class and the sensitivities (bij values) are required to sum to 1 
(100%).” (Sharpe, 1992) The model, described by the equation (2), can be interpreted 
as though “the return on an asset i is represented as the return on a portfolio (shown by 
the sum of the terms in the bracketed expression) invested in the n asset classes plus a 
residual component (ei).” (Sharpe, 1992) He considered that the asset classes should 
be “mutually exclusive, exhaustive and have returns that differ […] and the asset class 
returns should either have low correlations with one another or, in cases in which 
correlations are high, different standard deviations.” (Sharpe, 1992) The asset classes 
were represented by the traditional indices on equities and bonds. Once he identified 
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the appropriate asset classes, he estimated the respective sensitivities to these asset 
classes and accordingly constructed a portfolio of these asset classes.  
 
Where Ri represents the return on asset I, Fij represents the value of factor j and ei is the non-
factor component of the return on i. 
The hedge fund modification to this approach is to account for more beta factors 
specific for hedge funds, as option-like dynamic trading, and to allow for short selling. 
Moreover, all the factors are based on traded securities or derivatives and hence are 
referred to as asset-based factors. Thus, the replication may exploit high frequency data 
with longer history. Once the appropriate factors are discovered a multiple regression is 
employed to estimate the factor loadings. These are used as a portfolio weights for 
individual factors represented by an index or some constructed portfolio, and the 
portfolio return is computed.  
However, on the other hand, there are some problems17 with this approach. First, 
there is a probability of misspecification of the model by introducing wrong factors or by 
omitting significant factors. Thus, the model may not accurately represent the replicated 
returns and may be exposed to further risks. Second, the dynamic trading of hedge 
funds induces non-linear and non-normal behavior of returns and time-varying factor 
exposures. Since the model is basically a multiple OLS regression, it can only account 
for linear and normal relationships, which may not be sufficient for hedge fund returns. 
The time-variation of factor exposures was dealt with by the employment of rolling 
window regression. This regression uses an ad hoc time lag as the window, which is 
used to estimate the exposures at the particular time. However, there has been a 
criticism of the ad hoc determination of the window that resulted in the application of 
                                              
17 The discussion of the problems of various approaches may be found in Roncalli and Teiletche 
(2007). 
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other econometric techniques, which we shall discuss later in this chapter. Third, the 
results of the model are sensitive on the specific sample periods and outliers and thus 
may not always be robust. All of these problems are manifested in the mixed results for 
different strategies. Directional strategies like Long/Short equity hedge, Emerging 
markets or Global macro are more exposed to the factors than the relative value 
arbitrage strategies that are exposed to different risks. Moreover the out-of-sample 
performance of the models is not satisfactory. Nevertheless, this approach is very 
popular, since it uses transparent methods and provides more liquid and less cost-
consuming investment possibilities.  
II. Rule based approach 
This approach is more bottom-up than the factor model approach. It is based on 
actual replication of the most popular hedge fund trades. The replication discovers the 
risk premia of these trading strategies and than creates a mechanical rule based 
investment strategy. These hedge fund trading strategies provide the above mentioned 
alternative beta exposure to the markets. Since this exposure is generated by the 
utilization of the special investment techniques and tools that are allowed to hedge 
funds, the replication often makes use of derivatives, mainly options. The most common 
rule based strategies are trend following, momentum trades, carry trades, spread trades 
or another option strategies. Since this approach is in fact based on the dynamic non-
linear trading return profiles it successfully removes this problem contrary to the factor 
model approach and has satisfactory results in replicating the returns of not only hedge 
fund indices, but individual hedge funds as well.  
However, it also has some problems. First, the most replicated strategies are the 
most popular strategies and hence, there is a possibility of overcrowding problem, 
where the replication products would compete among themselves and moreover with 
the hedge funds. Moreover, hedge funds employ a diversity of such trading strategies, 
which makes them less prone to the risk. The problem of overcrowding may become 
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more serious with the rapid development of the industry. Another problem with this 
approach is the nature of the replication. The replication aims to replicate rather 
complicated hedge fund trading strategies, which may create more operational risks and 
high trading costs. On top of that, the transparency problem is not solved, since the 
strategies often use black-box optimization techniques. Consequently, even though this 
approach solves the dynamic trading problem, it still lacks some features that will 
diversify them more from the hedge funds. As an example of such a feature is the 
imposition of management as well as performance fees for these products that are not 
substantially lower than that of hedge funds. However, many investment banks have 
recently developed their own products oriented on rule based investment replicating 
some basic hedge fund trading styles and intend to launch even more products of this 
kind.  
III. Payoff distribution approach 
This approach has a rather different goal in replicating hedge fund returns. 
Contrary to the previous two approaches, instead of trying to replicate the month-to-
month returns of the hedge funds (or hedge fund indices) it aims to replicate the return 
characteristics of the hedge funds, i.e. the return distribution. The general model was 
developed by Kat and Palaro (2005), “who developed a technique, called ‘FundCreator’, 
to design futures trading strategies that generate returns with predefined statistical 
properties. Although FundCreator is primarily a general-purpose risk management tool 
and not designed to replicate anything in particular, it can be used to design trading 
strategies that generate returns with properties similar to those of hedge funds or hedge 
fund indices.” (Kat, 2007) By replicating the return characteristics and not the actual 
return generating process, the individual month-to-month returns may differ substantially 
from the hedge fund returns. However, the authors argue that hedge fund investors 
invest into hedge funds for their return characteristics, i.e. low volatility or low correlation 
to the traditional market factors, and it is sufficient to generate these characteristics. 
“The basic idea behind the proposed procedure is straightforward. From the theory of 
dynamic trading it is well known that in the standard theoretical model with complete 
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markets one can perfectly hedge any payoff. Therefore, if we can find a payoff function 
which, given the probability distribution of the underlying index or indices, implies the 
desired distribution, we will also have found the dynamic trading strategy which 
generates (returns that are drawings from) that distribution.” (Kat and Palaro, 2005) 
Moreover, this replication approach may be incorporated into an investor’s portfolio. The 
process of the replication starts by inferring the joint distributions of the hedge fund 
return and the investor’s portfolio return referred to as desired distribution, and of the 
investor’s portfolio return and the return on the reserve asset (some underlying asset for 
the replication) referred to as building block distribution. Then, the payoff function which 
maps the building block distribution into the desired distribution is determined and 
priced. And finally, the allocations to the investor’s portfolio and the reserve asset are 
determined. If the investor doesn’t have a portfolio, the process is restricted to creating 
the payoff function for the building block distribution, pricing the payoff function and 
replicating.  
This approach as well meets with some problems. First, the assumption of 
effective markets may bring some inconsistency between the empirically derived payoff 
function and the actual trading strategy. Next, the period in which the distribution of the 
replicated product will match the distribution of hedge fund is not certain and will 
probably require longer spans. Finally, the equality of the distribution functions doesn’t 
imply the equality of the achieved returns. Hence, if the investor invests into the product 
just for the sake of the returns and not for the sake of the diversification potential, the 
result may not be fully achieved. Moreover, the caveats about the complex black-box 
investment and potential trading costs from the previous approach apply here as well.   
IV. New approaches 
As we have seen in the previous sections, most of the fundamental approaches 
lack some feature and hence are ready to be amended or replaced by new approaches. 
The most popular and the simplest to apply is probably the factor model approach, 
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since the remaining two don’t solve the problem with complex trading strategies and 
black-box investment. However, as we have already mentioned there are two 
fundamental issues with the factor model approach, dynamic or non-linear trading and 
time varying exposures, which induce the out-of-sample prediction problems. 
Accordingly, the new approaches are trying to cope with these problems. There are two 
directions of the development. The first direction is to create non-linear factor models 
that will relate in a non-linear manner the fundamental factors to the hedge fund returns. 
According to Martellini there are two primary ways to solve this problem proposed by 
various authors. First, “heuristic attempts to introduce ad-hoc option portfolios to 
improve the performance of a hedge fund factor model.” (Martellini, 2007) These option 
portfolios will either use systematic analysis or specific trading strategies as trend 
following, fixed income arbitrage and other. Second, “statistical models aiming at 
extracting implied option payoffs from hedge fund return observations” (Martellini, 
2007), that are similar to the payoff distribution approach discussed earlier. On the other 
hand, the second direction is to create conditional factor models that may estimate the 
time varying exposures with a larger precision. Once again, there are basically two 
ways to solve this problem proposed by various authors. First, heuristic rule based or 
primitive trading strategies. And second, econometric autoregressive models, regime-
switching models, use of instrumental variables or Kalman filter.  
V. Kalman filter 
In this article we have decided to employ the Kalman filter technique. “The 
Kalman filter is an efficient recursive filter that estimates the state of a dynamic system 
from a series of incomplete and noisy measurements.”18 The filter uses the so called 
state space model, which linear representation of the dynamics of the n × 1 vector yt is 
as follows19: 
 
                                              
18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalman_filter 
19 The specification of the model is as in the EViews 4 User’s Guide and Roncalli and Teiletche, 
(2007). 
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Where αt is an m × 1 vector of possibly unobserved state variables and ct , Zt , dt , and Tt are 
conformable vectors and matrices, and  and vt are vectors of mean zero, Gaussian disturbances. 
The first equation is referred to as the “signal” equation and the second equation 
is referred to as the “state” equation. Moreover the disturbance vectors  and vt are 
assumed to be serially independent, with contemporaneous variance structure: 
 
Where Ht is an n × n symmetric variance matrix, Qt is an m × m symmetric variance matrix, and Gt 
is an n × m matrix of covariances. 
The actual filtering then proceeds as follows. Consider the conditional distribution 
of the state vector αt given information available at time s, and define the mean and 
variance matrix of the conditional distribution, where the subscript below the expectation 
operator indicates that the expectations are taken using the conditional distribution for 
that period, as: 
 
 
When we set s = t – 1, we obtain the one-step ahead mean and variance, which 
is under the Gaussian error assumption also the minimum mean square error (MSE) 
estimator of the mean and variance. Even if normality assumption is dropped, it is still 
the minimum mean square linear estimator of αt. Thus, we can also form the minimum 
MSE one-step ahead estimate of yt as: 
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The one-step ahead prediction error and prediction error variance are defined as: 
 
 
Finally, the Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm for sequentially updating the 
one-step ahead estimates given new information. Hence it calculates the estimates of 
the one-step ahead estimates in every point of the time interval. The application of this 
method to the hedge fund return replication is straightforward, as we set the signal and 
state equation respectively as following:  
 
 
Where Rt
HF represents the return of the hedge fund or hedge fund index,   represents the 
time varying intercept,  represent the exposure to the respective factor returns ,  
represents the idiosyncratic noise and k is the number of selected factors. 
Moreover we apply the portfolio constraint for the factor coefficients to sum up to 
100 % as follows: 
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Hence, “knowing the expected returns of each selected benchmark and using the 
Kalman filter assumption that the loadings are locally stationary, i.e. we can use the 
current style exposures as predictors of the one period ahead style exposures, we have 
all the required information to compute the fund expected return.” (Bodson et al., 2007) 
Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge the inconsistency between the assumption of 
normality used for Kalman filter and the purpose of the approach, which is to remove 
the issues of non-linearity and dynamic trading. “Therefore, our empirical application 
does not focus on the statistical properties of the estimators, but rather on their 
empirical predictive capacity.” (Bodson et al., 2007) The results of the empirical 
estimation will be discussed in the following chapter. 
VI. Conclusion 
The hedge fund return replication is a promising field of research that may allow 
a wide range of investors to invest their funds into hedge fund-like returns. The new 
approaches aim to provide better out of sample results and can make use of the 
integration of more approaches into one, as may be observed by the connection of 
factor model approach and the rule based approach. In addition there has been growing 
interest of mainly large investment banks in this kind of investment products for their 
clients. They are mainly specialized in the two approaches of replication, factor models 
and rule based approach. For the factor models, however, the development of these 
products is long before finishing, since although providing good results in the back-
testing, the actual performance of these models is wide from perfect. The models can 
replicate the returns of Funds of hedge funds, which are actually diversified portfolios of 
hedge funds, with good precision contrary to more specific hedge fund strategies. The 
reason for this may be the diversification nature of Funds of hedge funds that actually 
diversifies all the specific risks away and leaves the returns only exposed to the general 
market movements. Many objectors to the hedge fund replication highlight exactly this 
issue and claim that such products in fact diversify all of the true hedge fund returns 
away and leave the investor with just a market exposure. They claim that on top of their 
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return characteristics as low correlation to the markets and low volatility, investors invest 
into hedge funds for the specific risks taken by the managers and hence alpha.  
So, we get to the question of who should invest in the synthetic products. With 
the declining trend in alpha returns, there is a large proportion of managers that can not 
make up for the high fees they charge. Thus, it may be more efficient for the investors to 
invest in the passive, low cost products like hedge fund indices or replication products 
with considerably smaller fees, then to pay large fees to a manager who doesn’t 
possess the necessary skills. On the other hand, if the investor has the skills and is 
confident in selecting the manager who will provide true alpha, these passive products 
are not suitable for him. Yet there are still two more options for the investors who 
decided to invest into hedge fund replication products. In the chapter about hedge fund 
indices we have already discussed the pros and cons of investing into hedge fund 
indices and Funds of hedge funds. To sum up Funds of hedge funds provide the active 
management of portfolio of hedge funds with additional layer of hedge fund-like fees 
and not so large diversification. Hedge fund indices provide passive rule based 
selection of hedge funds with low fees, more diversification and individual strategy 
oriented products. Hedge fund replication products come closer to the hedge fund 
indices. They provide passive rule based investment strategies with low fees and the 
investor may decide among different hedge fund strategies. The substantial difference 
between them, however, is that the replication strategies operate with actual, more or 
less traditional asset returns, rather than with the returns of hedge funds. Hence they 
may provide more accurate representation of the industry and its return characteristics, 
and further be more representative of the potential of specific investment techniques 
that are permitted to hedge funds.   
We should not forget about the non-investable utilization of hedge fund return 
replication. It is intended mainly for the investors who could use it as another 
measurement of the performance of their managers and incorporate in into the 
contracts. Although it may be at odds with the absolute return nature of the industry, 
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such a benchmark may provide the investors with additional tool to discern between the 
well performing and the poor performing managers. 
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8. Empirical application 
In this chapter we will apply two hedge fund replication methods to the empirical 
data. First, we will run a basic static factor model as an OLS regression of the returns of 
selected factors on the returns of individual hedge fund indices. This will allow us to 
perform some analysis of the results. After the basic factor model, we will continue with 
the application of Kalman filter on the same set of factors and then assess the 
replication performance of this model. 
I. The data 
We will employ the data from the Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index. The 
basic information about this index was discussed earlier in the chapter about hedge 
fund indices. More specifically, we will employ the monthly return net-of-fees series of 
the fourteen hedge fund indices, where the composite index is the Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index, which is supposed to track the industry as a whole. 
The remaining sub-indices Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short Bias, Emerging 
Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Global Macro, 
Long/Short Equity, Managed Futures and Multi-Strategy are supposed to track the 
specific hedge fund strategies employed by individual hedge funds. Moreover, there are 
three sub-indices of the Event Driven index; which are Distressed, Multi-Strategy and 
Risk Arbitrage; which track the more specific constituents of this particular strategy. 
Hence, all in all, we will employ fourteen different indices in our analysis. The monthly 
returns on all above mentioned hedge fund indices are available for the time period 
January 1994 to December 2007 and the total number of observations is 168. 
Regarding the index biases described above, we need to make two comments. First, 
the backfill bias is not present in this data, since the returns of the new funds are added 
on going-forward basis and the historical index data are thus not adjusted with the 
inclusion of new funds. Second, in order to minimize the survivorship bias, the funds in 
a process of liquidation are not removed from the index unless they cease to operate. 
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Nevertheless, the survivorship bias can not be simply dealt with and the data will 
include it as well and hence, we should take it into account in our analysis.  
Table 3: Summary statistics of the monthly returns of hedge fund indices for the period January 
1994 to December 2007 
Index 
 
Annualized 
mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Hedge fund index 10,80% 8,53% -7,55% 7,49% 0,08 5,45 
Convertible arbitrage 8,53% 3,57% -4,68% 4,59% -1,29 5,98 
Dedicated short bias -0,45% 22,71% -8,69% 16,80% 0,84 5,00 
Event driven 11,42% 3,68% -11,77% 5,52% -3,26 25,93 
Event driven - 
Distressed 12,67% 4,10% -12,45% 6,14% -2,86 22,01 
Event driven - Multi-
Strategy 10,87% 4,66% -11,52% 6,00% -2,34 18,09 
Event driven - Risk 
arbitrage 7,64% 3,81% -6,15% 4,14% -1,04 8,80 
Emerging markets 10,80% 16,42% -23,03% 15,56% -0,73 8,04 
Equity market 
neutral 9,57% 3,26% -1,15% 2,82% 0,33 3,46 
Fixed income 
arbitrage 6,16% 2,05% -6,96% 3,64% -2,92 18,39 
Global macro 13,54% 10,60% -11,55% 10,42% 0,02 6,31 
Long/Short equity 12,04% 13,01% -11,43% 9,81% 0,20 7,02 
Managed futures 6,98% 9,95% -9,35% 11,92% 0,00 3,18 
Multi-Strategy 9,30% 3,61% -4,76% 4,32% -1,08 5,74 
S&P 500 9,20% 9,67% -14,58% 13,95% -0,59 3,82 
J.P. Morgan U.S. 
bond index 6,13% 3,72% -4,68% 4,60% -0,47 4,03 
First of all, we shall describe the observed returns of the hedge fund indices we 
are going to track in our replication. Table 3 shows the summary statistics of these 
indices. As we can see, the performance of these indices was outstanding, when more 
than half of the indices achieved annualized mean return of more than 10 % and only 
five strategies (almost all arbitrage strategies) were outperformed by the S&P 500. One 
exception is the Dedicated short bias index that provides negative annualized mean 
performance and was probably strongly affected by the bull markets during the 
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observation period. As regarding the volatility of the indices, it varies among the indices 
dependent on the strategy employed. However, five strategies achieved smaller 
volatility than the J.P. Morgan U.S. bond index and only two strategies achieved larger 
volatility than the S&P 500. Most of the strategies generate negative skewness, which 
on one hand is a sign that most returns are located on the right side of the mean, but on 
the other side that there are some extreme values on the left side of the mean. Further, 
most of the funds have minor kurtosis with the exception of the Event driven strategy 
and all of its sub-strategies and the Fixed income arbitrage strategy. This exposes them 
to the so called fat-tail risk, which refers to the risk of larger share of observations in the 
extremes than the normal distribution and may result in large losses if not accounted 
for. In addition, the Jarque-Bera statistic, which is testing the normality of the observed 
distribution, has rejected the normality for all strategies (and for S&P 500 and J.P. 
Morgan U.S. as well) except Equity market neutral and Managed futures. Thus, we 
need to interpret our results with this effect in mind, as we have already mentioned in 
the section about Kalman filter. 
To dig more into the risk characteristic of the indices, we have calculated further 
risk measures in the Table 4. The first one is the standard measure of risk-return 
performance called Sharpe ratio, which was calculated as  
 
where we took the mean return of 90 day U.S. Treasury security for the whole 
period as the risk-free return rate. All but three strategies have outperformed the J.P. 
Morgan U.S. bond index and only two strategies were outperformed by the S&P 500. 
This result indicates the quality of the risk management of the underlying hedge funds 
that can provide large returns with small volatility. The second measure is the Sortino 
ratio, which is a modification of Sharpe ratio. Contrary to the Sharpe ratio, it doesn’t 
discriminate against the upward volatility, and only takes into account the downside 
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volatility. In addition it works with user-specified target required rate of return rather than 
risk-free rate. The Sortino ratio is calculated as 
  
 
where we took the risk-free rate from above as the target rate. The term in the 
denominator is the downside risk, which is the semi-deviation of the negative returns 
calculated against the target rate of return. This measure provides similar results to the 
Sharpe ratio. Still, we have to acknowledge the larger increments as opposed to Sharpe 
ratio to the best performing strategies, notably Equity market neutral. The reason for 
these large increments lies in the next measure, which represents the percentage of 
months with negative returns. The best performing strategies in Sortino ratio are the 
ones with the smallest number of months with negative returns. The two extreme sides 
of this measure are the Equity market neutral with less than 15 % of months with 
negative returns and Dedicated short bias with more than 50 % of negative months. The 
last two measures are oriented once again on the downside risk. Maximum drawdown 
measures the largest peak-to-through decline during a period of investment. The 
Calmar ratio then utilizes maximum drawdown to compute the risk-return performance 
of an asset or a fund. In this case the measure of risk is based on the worst case 
scenario, rather than volatility of returns. The Calmar ratio is calculated as  
 
where the ratio is usually calculated for the period of three years. Once again, the 
Equity market neutral strategy differentiates largely form the other strategies. Also, 
Global macro strategy scored as the second best, which proves that even though it 
generates high volatility, it provides sufficient returns to compensate for the downside 
risk.  
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Table 4: Risk statistics of the monthly returns of hedge fund indices for the period January 1994 
to December 2007 
 
Annualized 
Sharpe 
ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino 
ratio 
# of 
negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar 
ratio* 
Hedge fund index 0,91 1,56 27,38% -13,81% 2,97 
Convertible arbitrage 0,98 1,43 22,62% -12,03% 1,22 
Dedicated short bias -0,27 -0,39 54,17% -46,57% 0,00 
Event driven 1,34 1,88 17,26% -16,05% 2,83 
Event driven - 
Distressed 1,41 2,04 19,05% -14,33% 2,71 
Event driven - Multi-
Strategy 1,14 1,65 20,83% -18,54% 2,08 
Event driven - Risk 
arbitrage 0,88 1,38 20,24% -7,61% 3,57 
Emerging markets 0,44 0,62 35,12% -45,14% 1,04 
Equity market neutral 1,97 4,88 14,29% -3,54% 28,57 
Fixed income 
arbitrage 0,59 0,74 20,24% -12,48% 1,31 
Global macro 0,91 1,54 25,60% -26,79% 5,83 
Long/Short equity 0,82 1,41 31,55% -15,04% 1,46 
Managed futures 0,25 0,38 44,05% -17,74% 0,46 
Multi-Strategy 1,22 1,91 17,86% -7,11% 4,62 
S&P 500 0,37 0,53 36,31% -46,28% 0,82 
J.P. Morgan U.S. 
bond index 0,46 0,70 32,74% -5,34% 1,74 
*Average Calmar ratio was computed as the average value of the five respective Calmar ratios, each 
computed for a three year period. 
To conclude this section, we should look at the correlation structure of the indices 
as presented in Table 5. As we can see, there is large correlation among the strategies 
that suggests that they are exposed to similar risks or that they transact in the same 
markets. Once again, we may see quite substantial correlation to the S&P 500 and 
limited correlation to the J.P. Morgan U.S. bond index. The last row of Table 5 
represents the first-order autocorrelation in the monthly returns. As we can see the 
majority of funds exhibits some level of autocorrelation with the highest levels reached 
by Convertible arbitrage, Fixed income and Event driven strategies, respectively. All of 
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these strategies are trading highly illiquid securities that may require price self-
estimation and pricing lags. Hence, high autocorrelation is often connected with the 
illiquidity exposure of hedge funds. Such an exposure, although often very profitable, 
will underestimate the true volatility in returns and hence overestimate the risk 
measures based on volatility. “Indeed positive autocorrelation has two effects: it drives 
down estimated volatility and it means that suddenly changing market conditions and 
shocks – as measured by the risk factors – distribute over several periods.” (Jaeger and 
Wagner, 2005) Thus direct investment in hedge funds or hedge fund indices may 
expose the investor to an additional risk factor. Further, we have tested the stationarity 
of the series of hedge fund indices returns. We used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
to test for unit root obtaining the results of rejecting the non-stationarity for all strategies. 
II. Static factor model 
In this section we will discus the results of the simple static factor model. The 
model is basically an Ordinary Least Squares regression of the chosen factors on the 
returns of hedge fund indices. We have selected the factors in accordance with the 
already established models of other authors, chiefly Fung, Hsieh and Jaeger, and where 
necessary, we have selected our own factors that would enhance the accuracy of the 
model fit. The model is characterized by the following equation  
 
where  is the return of the hedge fund index,  is the intercept,  is the 
exposure to the factor i and  is the selected factor, and where k is the number of 
selected factors. The results of the model can be seen in Table 6 below.   
The results show that there are large differences in the ability of chosen factors 
to accurately describe the development of individual strategies. The strategies, which 
could be modeled with the highest precision are Dedicated Short bias and Long/Short  
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Table 5: Correlation structure of the monthly returns of hedge fund indices for the period January 1994 to December 2007 
*The values in bold with asterisk represent statistically significant autocorrelation according to Ljung-Box Q-statistics. 
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Hedge fund index 100%                
Convertible arbitrage 43% 100%               
Dedicated short bias -49% -28% 100%              
Event driven 68% 58% -63% 100%             
Event driven - Distressed 59% 51% -62% 93% 100%            
Event driven - Multi-Strategy 69% 58% -54% 94% 75% 100%           
Event driven - Risk arbitrage 42% 43% -50% 67% 55% 64% 100%          
Emerging markets 66% 31% -55% 67% 59% 67% 43% 100%         
Equity market neutral 35% 35% -32% 37% 34% 34% 32% 23% 100%        
Fixed income arbitrage 45% 55% -11% 40% 33% 42% 18% 28% 15% 100%       
Global macro 85% 30% -14% 38% 32% 42% 16% 42% 23% 45% 100%      
Long/Short equity 80% 31% -72% 67% 59% 65% 52% 60% 36% 23% 44% 100%     
Managed futures 18% -8% 7% -8% -6% -9% -9% -5% 14% -1% 26% 6% 100%    
Multi-Strategy 27% 43% -16% 29% 20% 33% 15% 6% 26% 33% 17% 26% 10% 100%   
S&P 500 49% 16% -76% 56% 55% 48% 45% 48% 37% 6% 24% 60% -10% 14% 100%  
J.P. Morgan U.S. bond index 7% -1% 16% -14% -10% -16% -11% -11% 6% 4% 19% 0% 25% -5% -12% 100% 
First-order autocorrelation* 0,12 0,55* 0,11 0,30* 0,29* 0,28* 0,24* 0,28* 0,29* 0,38* 0,05 0,16* 0,06 0,02 -0,01 0,09 
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Table 6: Static factor model results for individual hedge fund strategies 
Index Factor Beta Adjusted R2 
Hedge fund index C 0,004 56% 
 U.S. TREASURY 3 Years -0,048  
 JP Morgan non-US gov. bonds 0,531  
 Merrill Lynch Japanese Gov. -0,263  
 MSCI EAFE 0,181  
 Wilshire Micro Cap index 0,152  
 spread Moody's (AAA vs BAA) 0,341  
 Gold (London Gold Market) 0,059  
Convertible arbitrage C 0,001 62% 
 Citigroup Inv. Grade Convertible 0,417  
 CSFB High Yield 0,284  
 Wilshire Large Cap index -0,244  
 Wilshire Micro Cap index 0,032  
 Merill Lynch Global Broad Market Corporate Index 3-5 Yrs -0,149  
 AR(1) 0,529  
Dedicated short bias C 0,007 77% 
 Citigroup Inv. Grade Convertible -0,452  
 Wilshire Large Cap Growth index -0,319  
 CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index 0,364  
 Wilshire Small Cap index -0,491  
Event driven C 0,003 68% 
 MSCI EM 0,080  
 spread Wilshire (Micro Cap vs. Large Cap Growth) 0,048  
 CSFB High Yield 0,236  
 Citigroup Inv. Grade Convertible 0,185  
 AR(1) 0,291  
Event driven - Distressed C 0,004 58% 
 CSFB High Yield 0,398  
 Wilshire Micro Cap index 0,072  
 CBOE S&P 500 BuyWrite Index 0,120  
 AR(1) 0,249  
Event driven - Multi-Strategy C 0,003 59% 
 CSFB High Yield 0,173  
 MSCI EM 0,104  
 Merrill Lynch Japanese Gov. -0,072  
 Citigroup Inv. Grade Convertible 0,146  
 spread Wilshire (Small Cap vs. Large Cap) 0,071  
 AR(1) 0,313  
  55 
Event driven - Risk arbitrage C 0,003 43% 
 Wilshire Mid Cap index 0,135  
 spread Wilshire (Small Cap Value vs. Large Cap Growth) 0,061  
 CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index 0,063  
 AR(1) 0,207  
Emerging markets C 0,005 62% 
 MSCI EM 0,546  
Equity market neutral C 0,005 21% 
 Wilshire Mid Cap Growth index 0,072  
 spread Wilshire (Small Cap Value vs. Small Cap Growth) 0,106  
 spread Wilshire (Large Cap Value vs. Large Cap Growth) -0,065  
 AR(1) 0,277  
Fixed income arbitrage C 0,001 46% 
 CSFB High Yield 0,159  
 Merrill Lynch EMU Direct Gov. Index -0,117  
 Merrill Lynch Japanese Gov. -0,257  
 Merrill Lynch Global Broad Market Corporate Index A Rated 0,867  
 Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate Master -0,523  
 AR(1) 0,366  
Global macro C 0,005 30% 
 Merrill Lynch Japanese Gov. -0,369  
 JP Morgan non-US gov. bonds 1,256  
 MSCI EM 0,144  
Long/Short equity C 0,006 71% 
 Wilshire Micro Cap index 0,208  
 Wilshire Large Cap Value index -0,275  
 CBOE DJIA BuyWrite Index -0,155  
 Citigroup Inv. Grade Convertible 0,561  
 MSCI EAFE 0,260  
Managed futures C 0,004 27% 
 CSFB High Yield -0,378  
 Merrill Lynch Japanese Gov. -0,234  
 Merrill Lynch EMU Direct Gov. Index 0,398  
 Goldman Sachs Commodity index 0,126  
 Wilshire Mid Cap Value index 0,279  
 U.S. TREASURY 1 Year -0,099  
 CBOE DJIA BuyWrite Index -0,252  
Multi-Strategy C 0,007 27% 
 spread Moody's (AAA vs BAA) 0,186  
 CBOE DJIA BuyWrite Index -0,047  
 Citigroup Inv. Grade Convertible 0,092  
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 US Dollar Index Future -0,146  
 CSFB High Yield 0,153  
 Merrill Lynch Japanese Gov. -0,102  
    
equity with more than 70 % of the variation of returns explained. On the other side of the 
spectrum are Equity market neutral, Multi-Strategy and Managed futures with the 
explanatory power of less than 30 %. However, it is no coincidence that exactly the 
strategies Equity market neutral and Multi-Strategy have scored the top ranks in our risk 
measures. Thus, it is hard to model such strategies that provide extraordinary risk-
return performance with the returns of equity market and the risk of bonds. A strategy 
with opposite characteristics is the Emerging market strategy, which is significantly 
correlated with the MSCI Emerging market index that on his own can explain substantial 
extent of variation. Next, we can recognize the abundance of the AR(1) factors and the 
high betas associated with them. The strategies with these factors are exactly those 
identified in the Table 5 as the ones with serial autocorrelation in the returns of these 
strategies. This indicates the illiquidity exposure and a lagged valuation of that needs to 
be accounted for. We have further performed the CUSUM test for parameter instability. 
The test is based on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals and plots this sum 
against the 5 % critical lines. If the CUSUM line goes outside the critical lines, the test 
indicates parameter instability as depicted in Figure 14. The test showed that all but two 
equations had stabile parameters during the observation period. The two strategies 
were Event driven and Equity market neutral, but both showed only small instability.  
As the static factor model is only the first step of our analysis, we will leave a 
more detailed discussion of the results of individual strategies for the next section and 
then try to draw some conclusions. We will now turn to the dynamic version of factor 
model which utilizes Kalman filter. 
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Figure 14: The results of CUSUM stability test  
            Equity market neutral:            Event driven: 
 
III. Dynamic factor model 
In this section, we will apply Kalman filter to account for time-varying exposures 
of individual factors. This will allow as a better replication of the dynamic nature of 
hedge fund investing. We will use the model described above in the section about 
Kalman filter, which is represented by the following equations  
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where we have set the portfolio constraint of the exposures to sum to unity, 
which we didn’t apply in the static factor model. Another change from the previous static 
model is that we have not included the AR(1) factors since the Kalman filter should deal 
better with autocorrelation and it is not an asset based factor. Further, we will do a 
backtesting of the results of the model and compare them to the actual performance of 
the indices. We shall now turn to the individual results. 
Hedge fund index 
This index is the most diversified from the analyzed indices, since it is the 
composite index that encompasses all the sub-indices. The weights of individual sub-
indices were changing throughout the period and hence it was exposed to a variety of 
factors. As can be seen from Table 6, it is exposed to a mixture of bonds, equities and 
commodities. The factors that had the largest weights and at the same time were the 
most time-varying were the spread between the Moody’s AAA vs. BAA bonds and the 
J.P. Morgan non-U.S. government bonds. Altogether, this index is mostly exposed to 
non-U.S. factors and thus reflects the global trends.  
The results of backtesting can be seen in Table 7, Table 8 and Figure 15. The 
replicated model achieved a correlation to the index of 68 %. The clone, however, was 
outperformed by the index in all measures although only by a small margin. An 
exception is a reduction in kurtosis, which reduces the fat tail risk of extreme returns 
and is represented by the larger minimum monthly return. On the other hand the clone 
was more exposed to the drawdown risk, where the maximum drawdown was almost 5 
% larger than that of the index. Regarding the correlation to the equities, the clone was 
less exposed than the actual index with the correlation to the S&P 500 of 44 %. 
Accordingly, both the index and the clone have retained its performance even during the 
bullish market in the early 2000’s.  
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Table 7: Summary statistics for the Hedge fund index and its clone 
Index 
 
Annualized 
mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Hedge fund index 10,80% 8,53% -7,55% 7,49% 0,08 5,45 
Hedge fund index 
- clone 10,69% 7,24% -5,78% 8,07% -0,09 3,99 
Table 8: Risk statistics for the Hedge fund index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio* 
Hedge fund index 0,91 1,56 27,38% -13,81% 4,25 
Hedge fund index 
- clone 0,83 1,36 29,17% -18,53% 3,44 
*The average Calmar ratio was calculated as an average value of the three most recent Calmar ratios for 
all Tables in this section 
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Convertible arbitrage20 
This strategy embraces two trading techniques. The first one aims to profit from 
the mispricing of convertible bonds, while hedging against credit risk. It “simply buys the 
convertible bond, sells short the underlying equity and re-establishes a delta hedge.” 
(Jaeger and Wagner, 2005) The second one, on the other hand, aims to profit from the 
mispricing in credit risk of convertible bonds. Hence the composite strategy is exposed 
both to the credit risk and equity risk. Our replication takes these exposures into 
account, when the chosen factors are a mixture of convertible bonds, bonds and 
equities. All factors are rather stabile during the observation period. Moreover, we can 
see the replication of the actual trading strategies, when there are equal exposures with 
for the Citigroup Investment Grade Convertible and an equal short position on the 
Wilshire Large Cap index. The remaining factors take bets on the credit risk of bonds. 
This time, the backtesting show more promising results, when the clone 
outperformed the actual index during the observed period. The annualized mean return 
of the clone was 0,6 % larger than that of the index. However, the clone created larger 
volatility of the returns, which rendered in the outperformance of the index in the Sharpe 
ratio. Nevertheless, the Sortino ratio once again voted for the clone, when it 
outperformed the actual index. Regarding the risk of drawdown, the clone did once 
again a better job, when it reduced the maximum drawdown by more than 3 %. This 
was confirmed by the shift of the skewness to positive range for the clone. The overall 
correlation to the index was 54 %, which shows that there are still some important 
missing factors to look for. In addition the clone was showed only minor correlation both 
to the S&P 500 (14 %) and J.P. Morgan U.S. government bond index (27 %). 
 
 
                                              
20 Due to the fact that some factors are available only for shorter periods than the index returns, 
we have changed the sample according to the common period. (This holds for each strategy with this 
issue.) 
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Table 9: Summary statistics for the Convertible arbitrage index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Convertible arbitrage 8,70% 3,57% -4,68% 4,72% -1,35 6,39 
Convertible arbitrage 
- clone 9,37% 8,33% -5,05% 6,36% 0,67 6,14 
Table 10: Risk statistics for the Convertible arbitrage index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Convertible arbitrage 0,99 1,45 27,27% -12,04% 1,62 
Convertible arbitrage 
- clone 0,84 1,60 21,97% -8,95% 2,50 
 
Dedicated short bias 
Dedicated shorts is the only strategy that provided negative performance due to 
the strong bull markets during the observed period. The exposures are similar to that of 
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convertible arbitrage, when naturally it is exposed negatively to the equity market. The 
clone provides a hedging of long Citigroup Investment Grade Convertible against short 
Wilshire Large Cap Growth index and long CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index against short 
Wilshire Short Cap index. Hence it simply tries to hedge away the risk of the bullish 
market to this strategy, with the convertibles rising in bull markets and put write options 
providing a protection against bull markets.  
Once again, the clone outperformed the actual index, when it managed to 
produce a positive annualized mean return. A slightly larger standard deviation didn’t 
prevent the clone from outperforming the index in all risk measures but the maximum 
drawdown, where the clone is more exposed to the downside risk. The correlation of the 
clone with the index was 62 %, with the J.P. Morgan U.S. government bond index 24 % 
and with the S&P 500 – 48 %. Such a large negative correlation to the equity market 
may proof to be a good feature of an asset class in a portfolio, serving as a good 
diversifier.  
Table 11: Summary statistics for the Dedicated short bias index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualize
d Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Dedicated short bias -0,45% 22,71% -8,69% 16,80% 0,84 5,00 
Dedicated short bias 
- clone 0,59% 15,33% -19,08% 17,94% -0,29 4,27 
Table 12: Risk statistics for the Dedicated short bias index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Dedicated short bias -0,27 -0,39 47,62% -46,57% -0,02 
Dedicated short bias 
- clone -0,19 -0,26 54,17% -51,75% 0,04 
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Event driven 
This strategy is constituted of the three sub-strategies that will be discussed 
below. Thus, the composite strategy embraces the exposures of all sub-strategies, 
being exposed to equity and bond markets. Not surprisingly, the equity exposure is 
represented by the Wilshire Micro Cap index, since most of the distress takes place in 
the smaller companies. Such companies also issue high yield bonds, what is reflected 
in the long/short position in the CSFB High Yield. The long position in Citigroup 
Investment Grade Convertible account for the hedging technique of the event driven 
hedge funds.  
This time, the index outperforms the clone in almost all measures, yet by a small 
margin. The clone only tops the index in the more appropriate Sortino ratio and the 
downside risk, where it reduces maximum drawdown by almost 9 %. In addition, it 
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substantially reduces the kurtosis and hence the fat tail risk. The clone is correlated with 
the index by solid 73 % and shows correlation with the S&P 500 of 55 %. All in all, the 
clone seems to react to the growth of equity markets less markedly and lags the index 
particularly in these situations.  
Table 13: Summary statistics for the Event driven index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Event driven 11,42% 3,68% -11,77% 5,52% -3,26 25,93 
Event driven - clone 11,07% 6,18% -7,76% 5,98% -0,69 6,56 
Table 14: Risk statistics for the Event driven index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Event driven 1,34 1,88 17,26% -16,05% 3,33 
Event driven - clone 1,18 1,95 29,17% -7,76% 2,91 
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Event driven - Distressed 
The Distressed sub-strategy specializes in investing into companies in financial 
distressed and bankruptcy proceedings, where it profits from the discounts and 
mispricing of securities of such companies. The clone is exposed chiefly to the CSFB 
High Yield, and to smaller extent to the Wilshire Micro Cap index and CBOE S&P 500 
BuyWrite Index.  
The clone outperforms the actual index by a substantial margin, when the 
annualized mean return of the clone is higher by 5 %. Similarly, the clone tops the index 
in almost all risk measures, but the average Calmar ratio. The correlation to the index is 
69 %, but we may notice a large correlation to the S&P 500 of 68 % as well. The 
outperformance of the clone may be accounted for by its ability to better withstand the 
bearish market than the index. 
Table 15: Summary statistics for the Event driven - Distressed index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualize
d Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Event driven - 
Distressed 12,67% 4,10% -12,45% 6,14% -2,86 22,01 
Event driven - 
Distressed - clone 17,64% 6,17% -8,32% 6,68% -1,15 7,34 
 
Table 16: Risk statistics for the Event driven - Distressed index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Event driven - 
Distressed 1,41 2,04 19,05% -14,33% 3,19 
Event driven - 
Distressed - clone 2,04 3,26 20,83% -8,32% 2,49 
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Event driven – Multi-Strategy 
The exposures of this strategy are very similar to that of the composite Event 
driven strategy, since the Multi-Strategy funds do also exploit the possibility of investing 
across different asset classes, when they invest into event driven equities and credit. 
Our clone captures these exposures as well, with the primary exposure to the CSFB 
High Yield index, and to a smaller extent to the Citigroup Investment Grade Convertible 
and Wilshire Small Cap vs. Large Cap index spread. The exposures are rather stabile 
during the observation period, with the exception of small fluctuation in the MSCI EM 
factor. 
The actual index outperforms the clone by a small margin, when both show a 
rather strong performance. Yet, the clone seems to be less exposed to the downside 
risk, with a higher Calmar ratio. Another noticeable fact is the reduction in the kurtosis of 
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the clone. The correlation of the clone with the index is 63 % and with the S&P 500 41 
%, which is smaller than that of the index.   
Table 17: Summary statistics for the Event driven – Multi-Strategy index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Event driven - Multi-
Strategy 10,87% 4,66% -11,52% 6,00% -2,34 18,09 
Event driven - Multi-
Strategy - clone 10,50% 7,20% -9,21% 6,56% -1,01 7,94 
Table 18: Risk statistics for the Event driven – Multi-Strategy index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Event driven - Multi-
Strategy 1,14 1,65 20,83% -18,54% 2,53 
Event driven - Multi-
Strategy - clone 0,99 1,50 26,79% -12,90% 2,69 
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Event driven – Risk arbitrage 
This strategy, sometimes referred to as merger arbitrage, strives to profit from 
the spreads in merger and acquisition transactions. The main exposures of this strategy 
are the deal risk and the equity market risk, even though in a stock merger, the 
managers tries to diversify equity market exposure by going long the target stocks and 
shorting the acquirer’s stocks. Hence, our clone tries to capture these exposures by the 
investment into the spread between Wilshire Small Cap Value vs. Large Cap Growth 
index, the CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite Index and to a smaller degree into the Wilshire Mid 
Cap index. The CBOE S&P 500 PutWrite index is supposed to protect the investor from 
the losses in the spread due to the bullish large cap market. The spread factor is the 
most volatile.   
Even though the clone outperforms the index in annualized mean return, the 
actual index generates better risk-adjusted performance and tops the fund in all risk 
measures. The reason for this is the larger values for the annualized standard deviation 
and maximum drawdown, which indicate that the actual hedge funds are better in 
diversifying risk. The correlation of the clone with the index is 45 %. Further, the 
correlations with the two benchmarks are a bit higher then for the index with 46 % 
correlation with the S&P 500 and – 12 % with the J.P. Morgan U.S. government bond 
index.  
Table 19: Summary statistics for the Event driven – Risk arbitrage index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Event driven - Risk 
arbitrage 7,64% 3,81% -6,15% 4,14% -1,04 8,80 
Event driven - Risk 
arbitrage - clone 7,94% 7,94% -9,49% 7,22% -0,99 8,57 
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Table 20: Risk statistics for the Event driven – Risk arbitrage index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Event driven - Risk 
arbitrage 0,88 1,38 20,24% -7,61% 2,08 
Event driven - Risk 
arbitrage - clone 0,54 0,78 30,95% -12,88% 0,99 
 
Emerging markets 
Emerging market index tracks the hedge funds that invest across equities, debt, 
credit and currencies of developing markets. Hence, the index and individual funds are 
exposed to various asset classes. Our clone, however, employs only one factor, the 
MSCI Emerging markets index, due to our limited sources of data. Nevertheless, the 
single factor tracks the index with astonishing precision.  
The index outperforms the clone by 1 % in the annualized mean return. The 
results on the risk-adjusted performance are indeed not so heartbreaking for the index, 
when it tops the clone only by a small margin and moreover generates larger volatility 
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and is exposed greatly to a downside risk, when the maximum drawdown, reaching – 45 
%, is twice as large as that of the clone. The correlation of the clone with the index is a 
solid 71 %, but is quite high for the S&P 500 with 57 % as well. 
Table 21: Summary statistics for the Emerging markets index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Emerging markets 10,80% 16,42% -23,03% 15,56% -0,73 8,04 
Emerging markets - 
clone 9,67% 13,02% -24,97% 14,96% -1,63 11,11 
Table 22: Risk statistics for the Emerging markets index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Emerging markets 0,44 0,62 35,12% -45,14% 1,70 
Emerging markets - 
clone 0,38 0,50 33,93% -28,32% 2,48 
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Equity market neutral 
This strategy aims to profit from the specific group of stocks, while hedging away 
the general equity market exposure. Our previous analysis of this index showed that it 
provides extraordinary risk-adjusted performance, with large returns and low volatility. 
To replicate these results, we have utilized the Wilshire Mid Cap Growth index and the 
spreads between Wilshire Small Cap Value vs. Small Cap Growth index and Large Cap 
Value vs. Large Cap Growth index. All factors in our clone had quite volatile exposures, 
with small cap spread generating the largest beta. 
As we would suggest, the replication of such extraordinary risk-adjusted 
performance would be quite difficult and our clone was not successful in replicating 
them. Although it provided a bit larger annualized mean return, it could be accounted for 
by the unexplained outlier in the third month of 1994, which further affected the other 
risk measures of the clone. The index outperforms the clone in every risk measure by 
quite a margin, even if we would account for the outlier. A noticeable result is the huge 
kurtosis of the clone. However, to our defense, we must note that the strategy exploits 
two different fundamental trading techniques, the statistical arbitrage based on 
quantitative methods and systematic trading based on value and momentum analysis. 
Since both techniques are exposed to different risks, the replication is all the more 
difficult. The final correlation of the subsample to the actual index was around 30 %, and 
the clone produced larger correlation with the S&P 500 amounting to 41 % as well.  
Table 23: Summary statistics for the Equity market neutral index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Equity market neutral 9,57% 3,26% -1,15% 2,82% 0,33 3,46 
Equity market neutral 
- clone 9,65% 46,22% -12,84% 13,85% 8,57 101,09 
Equity market neutral 
– clone (subsample*) 6,95% 6,47% -2,82% 5,22% 0,46 4,56 
*The subsample omits the first 3 observations of the monthly returns, where the third was the outlier.  
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Table 24: Risk statistics for the Equity market neutral index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Equity market neutral 1,97 4,88 14,29% -3,54% 42,86 
Equity market neutral 
- clone 0,41 1,20 32,74% -16,47% 1,39 
Equity market neutral 
– clone (subsample) 0,56 0,93 32,12% -9,34% 1,28 
 
Fixed income arbitrage 
This strategy transacts on the fixed income market, where it tries to exploit the 
inefficiencies between related fixed income securities. Our clone takes the asset class 
location into account and employs only fixed income indices. The employed factors 
range from government bonds to different corporate bond indices. All factors are very 
volatile and some vary their exposures from negative to positive during the observation 
period.  
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Once again, we may see that the clone outperforms the index in the annualized 
mean return, but lacks the reduction in volatility and is topped by the index in the risk-
adjusted measures, even though by a small margin. The correlation of the clone with 
the index is 40 %, with the J.P. Morgan U.S. government bond index 27 % and with the 
S&P 500 31 %. However, as we can see from Figure 24, the J.P. Morgan benchmark 
outperforms both the clone and the index during the observation period.  
Table 25: Summary statistics for the Fixed income arbitrage index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Fixed income 
arbitrage 5,38% 2,05% -6,96% 3,77% -3,12 19,37 
Fixed income 
arbitrage - clone 5,60% 5,27% -9,79% 6,24% -1,36 10,10 
Table 26: Risk statistics for the Fixed income arbitrage index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Fixed income 
arbitrage 0,36 0,44 20,45% -12,47% 1,48 
Fixed income 
arbitrage - clone 0,25 0,34 33,33% -13,43% 1,28 
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Global macro 
This strategy focuses on the identification and forecast of global political and 
macroeconomic trends and to estimate the impact of these trends on equity, fixed 
income, currency and commodity markets. Hence the range of possible exposures is 
very large and may vary in times. Our clone employs the exposure to the fixed income 
market with the Merrill Lynch Japanese Government bond index and the J.P. Morgan 
non-US government bond index; and to the equity market with the MSCI Emerging 
market index. Yet, the chosen factors did a poor job in the replication and provided the 
worst result in the precision of replication in our analysis. To better explain the variation 
of returns in this strategy, other authors exploited some rule based factors, mainly look-
back straddles on bonds, currencies and commodities or other rule based techniques 
based on the futures markets. Due to the fact that such factors would require excessive 
detail data and better knowledge of such products, we weren’t able to use them. 
As we can see, the index outperformed the clone by almost 5 % in annualized 
mean return and although it had larger volatility it topped the clone in risk measures as 
well. The correlation of the clone with the index was 57 %, with the S&P 500 it was 14 
% and with the J.P. Morgan U.S. government bond index 19 %.  
Table 27: Summary statistics for the Global macro index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Global macro 13,54% 10,60% -11,55% 10,42% 0,02 6,31 
Global macro - clone 7,85% 8,33% -20,90% 9,95% -2,44 21,45 
Table 28: Risk statistics for the Global macro index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Global macro 0,91 1,54 25,60% -26,79% 9,03 
Global macro - clone 0,39 0,51 33,93% -23,09% 2,29 
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Long/Short equity hedge 
Not surprisingly this strategy exposes itself to the equity markets, where the 
managers may focus on different sectors, regions or market capitalization and where 
they try to hedge against the market downturn by short selling. Our clone does as well 
utilize the exposure of U.S. equity markets with the Wilshire Micro Cap and Large Cap 
Value indices and foreign equity markets with the MSCI EAFE index. However, it uses a 
bond factor Citigroup Investment Grade Convertible and a non-linear factor CBOE DJIA 
BuyWrite Index. Both these factors are meant to protect against the downturn of equity 
markets, when the convertible bond protects up to the value of the bond and the buy 
write index by an issuance of the covered call options. All factors are rather volatile 
during the observation period. 
The index outperforms the clone, though the replication succeeds to track most 
of the measures very closely. The only measure, were the clone falls short by a larger 
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margin is the maximum drawdown, where it is liable to larger downside risk. The 
correlation of the clone with the index is solid 79 %, which is the largest in our analysis. 
Further, the clone has a large correlation to the S&P 500 index as well with 66 %. This 
larger correlation of the clone to the S&P 500 may be the reason, why it lacks in the 
performance, since it wasn’t able to withstand the falling market as well as the index.    
Table 29: Summary statistics for the Long/Short equity index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Long/Short equity 11,78% 13,01% -11,43% 10,27% 0,23 7,58 
Long/Short equity - 
clone 10,24% 11,43% -11,20% 11,72% -0,22 4,68 
Table 30: Risk statistics for the Long/Short equity index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Long/Short equity 0,76 1,29 32,79% -15,05% 1,64 
Long/Short equity - 
clone 0,53 0,82 33,61% -26,11% 1,25 
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Managed futures 
This strategy once again transacts globally in a wide range of asset classes like 
futures on bonds, equities, commodities and currencies. Our clone tries to capture these 
various exposures by investing into Goldman Sachs Commodity index, various bond 
indices and the equity part is represented by the Wilshire Mid Cap Value index and the 
CBOE DJIA BuyWrite Index. However, the use of other factors, similar to the Global 
macro index, would be needed to capture the variations of this strategy more precisely. 
The index outperforms the clone in all measures, although not by a large margin 
and as we may see from Figure 27, the clone catches up in the second half of the 
observation period. The correlation of the clone with the index is weak 18 %, however 
the correlation to the S&P 500 with 10 % and J.P. Morgan U.S. government bond index 
6 % is low as well. 
Table 31: Summary statistics for the Managed futures index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Managed futures 7,76% 9,95% -8,62% 12,01% 0,12 2,80 
Managed futures - 
clone 6,61% 15,82% -13,10% 12,92% -0,01 5,77 
Table 32: Risk statistics for the Managed futures index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Managed futures 0,31 0,50 44,26% -14,22% 0,47 
Managed futures - 
clone 0,20 0,29 41,80% -26,48% 0,39 
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Multi-Strategy 
As the name indicates, this strategy is characterized by the ability to utilize 
various hedge fund strategies based on the perceived profitability options. Hence the 
strategy is rather diversified and reduces the asset class and strategy specific risk. Our 
clone thus strives to make use of such diversification by employing factors from 
currency market with US Dollar Index Future, from equity markets with CBOE DJIA 
BuyWrite Index and from various U.S. and non-U.S. fixed income related indices.  
Once again, we may see that although the clone outperforms the index in the 
annualized mean return, it falls short in the risk-adjusted performance albeit this time 
only little. A noticeable fact is the high Calmar ratio, which is the highest amongst clones 
and the fourth highest compared to the indices. Yet still, the correlation with the index 
reaches only 19 %. The correlations to the benchmarks are 20 % with the S&P 500 and 
-11 % with the J.P. Morgan U.S. government bond index. 
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Table 33: Summary statistics for the Multi-Strategy index and its clone 
Index Annualized mean 
Monthly 
max. 
Monthly 
min. 
Annualized 
Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Multi-Strategy 9,24% 2,76% -4,76% 3,60% -1,48 9,12 
Multi-Strategy - clone 10,37% 12,57% -4,95% 5,74% 2,44 24,75 
Table 34: Risk statistics for the Multi-Strategy index and its clone 
Index Annualized Sharpe ratio 
Annualized 
Sortino ratio 
# of negative 
months (%) 
Maximum 
drawdown 
Average 
Calmar ratio 
Multi-Strategy 1,45 2,34 14,16% -4,76% 6,56 
Multi-Strategy - clone 1,11 2,20 22,12% -5,14% 4,51 
 
Conclusion 
The previous sections outlined the possibility of hedge fund return replication with 
the use of time varying exposures to various factors. It revealed that the degree of 
replication precision varied among different strategies. We may observe that the best 
results were obtained for directional strategies, which are moreover primarily exposed to 
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the equity markets. On the other hand, the relative value arbitrage strategies, which are 
often quantitative strategies of market makers are harder to replicate by simple factors 
and would require more rule base factors to account for their variations. The clones with 
the highest correlation with the index were for the strategies of Long/Short equity (79 
%), Event driven (73 %) and Emerging markets (71 %). On the other side of the 
spectrum lie the last two strategies with the lowest correlation, the Managed futures (18 
%) and Multi-Strategy (19 %). Still, some strategies need further scrutiny to identify and 
describe the more appropriate factors, which would explain the variation of their returns 
to a larger extent. Further, the clones have removed the autocorrelation from the returns 
of all strategies, using the Kalman filter and thus got also rid of the possible liquidity risk.  
Our results show that the hardest part of the replication is to replicate the risk-
adjusted returns of the indices. Our clone could outperform the Sharpe ratio of the 
indices only in two instances, the Sortino ratio in three instances and the Calmar ratio in 
four instances. The clones provide more downside protection, when six of them 
generated smaller maximum drawdown, which however, in some cases might be 
because of the lack of performance. Still, if we took into account the biases of the 
indices, which would reduce their performance, the clones would provide similar risk 
adjusted results in most of the cases.  
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9. Epilogue 
Hedge funds are investment vehicles that provide solid risk-adjusted 
performance in various stages of market cycle that are not strongly correlated to the 
markets they transact in. The profits from hedge funds were for a long time available 
only to high net-worth individuals or institutional investors, who could bear the possible 
negative effects of a serious downturn of the fund. The recent development in the hedge 
fund industry however leans toward the exploitation of hedge fund returns by a wider 
range of investors. Many hedge fund databases and investment banks have thus 
created different hedge fund indices and hedge fund clones that would replicate the 
exposures of hedge funds with smaller fees and smaller investment requirements. Our 
analysis showed that the development of such products has advanced into more 
promising stages, when new approaches are used to better replicate the hedge fund 
returns. Such products would have to be, however, provided by large investment banks 
that can achieve effective trading costs of the underlying factors and better access to 
the clients.  
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